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IMMIGRATION AND  TRADE-particularly  with  less  developed  countries 
(LDCs)-have  become  more significant to the U.S.  economy  since the 
1960s  than they  were  earlier  in  the  postwar  period.  The  number of 
immigrants  relative  to  native-born  workers  has  risen;  an  increasing 
proportion of  immigrants come  from less  developed  countries;  and a 
disproportionate number of immigrants have relatively  little schooling. 
The  ratio  of  exports  and imports  to  GDP  has  risen  as  well,  and an 
increasing proportion of imports have come from less developed  coun- 
tries.  Immigration  and trade have  thus  increased  the  effective  labor 
supply of less  skilled workers in the United States,  with potential con- 
sequences  for relative wages  and employment. 
To  what extent  might  the economic  woes  of  less  skilled  and low- 
paid  American  workers  be  attributed to  changes  in  trade or  immi- 
gration? To  what  extent  have  immigration  and trade benefited  other 
Americans? 
These  questions  have  spurred considerable  debate in recent years. 
Some  analysts  stress  the  potentially  adverse  distributional  effects  of 
immigration  and trade on low-income  Americans.  Others stress their 
potentially  positive  effects  on the economy.  Standard models  suggest 
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that both immigration and trade alter national output and the distribution 
of  income  through the  same  mechanism-by  increasing  the  nation's 
implicit supply of relatively  scarce factors of production-so  that their 
benefits and distributional costs are intrinsically related. While there is 
empirical  evidence  that trade may have more far-reaching benefits  on 
economic  performance, and one could argue that immigration may have 
positive  or negative  effects  on the aggregate  economy  through econ- 
omies  or diseconomies  of  scale,  trade and immigration are still  likely 
to affect  relative  economic  outcomes. ' Factors for which  immigration 
and  trade  are good  substitutes  will  lose  relative  to  factors  that  are 
complementary.9 
This paper provides new estimates of the impact of immigration and 
trade on the U.S.  labor market, taking account of the extensive  debate 
that has developed  since our earlier work.3 We first review  the dimen- 
sions  of  immigration  and trade flows  to  the  United  States  since  the 
1960s.  Then we examine  the relation between  economic  outcomes  for 
native workers and immigrant flows to regional labor markets. We next 
use the aggregate "factor proportions approach" to simulate the impact 
of  immigration  and trade on national supplies  of  labor by skill  under 
different counterfactuals.  We also consider Adrian Wood's  controver- 
sial  claim  that  using  input  coefficients  for  the  appropriate  import- 
competing  activities  leads  to  much  larger trade effects  than  we,  or 
others,  have estimated.4  We then use the factor proportions approach 
to examine the contributions of immigration and trade to recent changes 
in U.S.  educational wage differentials  and attempt to provide a broader 
assessment  of  the impact of  immigration  on the incomes  of  U.S.  na- 
tives.  Finally,  we offer some concluding  thoughts. 
Our major findings are as follows: 
-Immigration  does not have a consistent,  discernible effect  on area 
1. On the beneficial  effects of openness  to trade  on national  economic performance, 
see Frankel  and Romer  (1996) and Sachs and Warner  (1995). 
2.  This will  be true unless essentially no unskilled American works in import- 
competing activities (because U.S.  firms have shifted production  to utterly different 
products)  or competes  with immigrants  in the labor  market  (because  all immigrants  have 
skills that complement  those of natives). With a fixed linear  homogeneous  production 
function, if trade  or immigration  raises  GDP a lot, there  will necessarily  be large  effects 
on the distribution  of income (and small effects if GDP is raised  slightly). 
3.  Borjas, Freeman,  and Katz (1992). 
4.  Wood  (1994,  1995). George  J.  Borjas,  Richard B.  Freeman,  and Lawrence  F.  Katz  3 
economic  outcomes; other regional factors dominate the ups and downs 
of area economies. 
-The  location  decisions  of the native population respond to immi- 
gration; the native flow to the primary immigrant-receiving  state, Cal- 
ifornia,  has  been  greatly  reduced  by  the  influx  of  immigrants  since 
1970. 
-Immigration  has had a marked adverse  impact on the economic 
status of the least skilled U.S.  workers (high school dropouts and those 
in the bottom 20 percent of the wage distribution). 
-Trade  has had small effects  on the overall implicit labor supply of 
the less  skilled.  However,  the trade effect  is larger if one assumes that 
economic  activities  displaced  by imports employ  technologies  compa- 
rable to the least skilled  plants in U.S.  manufacturing industries. 
These are not the final words on the effects  of immigration and trade 
on the job  market. We  do not explore  all of  the possible  avenues  by 
which  these  flows  influence  labor market outcomes.  For instance,  we 
do not estimate  the extent  to which  immigrants may take jobs  that no 
native  would  take and so  may overstate  the effect  of  immigration  on 
the less  skilled.5  Nor do we  explore  the potential  effects  of  trade on 
native  outcomes  that occur entirely  through prices  (with no observed 
change  in trade quantities),  and thus we  may understate the distribu- 
tional effects  of trade on outcomes. 
The Two Shocks 
The starting point for our analysis  is the significant  increase  in im- 
migration  and trade that has  occurred  in the United  States  since  the 
1960s.  While  neither immigration  nor trade flows  are entirely  exoge- 
nous shocks  to the U.S.  job  market, the huge changes  in recent years 
have come  primarily from developments  that are unrelated to contem- 
poraneous labor market conditions  in the United States.  On the immi- 
gration side,  the major impetus for the increased  flow  of  legal  immi- 
gration from less  developed  countries  were  the  1965 Amendments  to 
5.  Hamermesh  (1997) contrasts  the quality  of jobs held by immigrants  and  by natives 
and finds little support  for this claim, so we doubt  that this is a major  consideration  in 
assessing the effect of immigration. 4  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
Table 1. The Foreign-Born  Population  of the United States  and Its National  Origins, 
1960-96 
Units as indicated 
Foreign-born population 
Item  1960  1970  1980  1990  1996 
In millions  9.7  9.7  14.1  19.8  24.6 
As percentage of entire population  5.4  4.8  6.2  7.9  9.3 
Distribution by origink 
Canada and Europe  84  68  43  26  ... 
Caribbean and Latin America  9  19  31  43  .  .  . 
Asia  5  9  18  25  . 
Other  2  4  8  6  ... 
Source: Authors  calculations.  Data for  1960 are fronm  U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of t1e UjiiiedI 
Stiates Coloniial Timiies  to 1870. vol.  I (Department of Commerce,  1975). Data for 1970-90  are from Statistical Abstract of' 
ilie U/1ied States (various years). Data for 1996 are from the Census Bureau and are available on the bureau's worldwide 
web page. 
a. Percent. 
the Immigration and Nationality  Act.6 Illegal  immigration has also re- 
sponded to policy  developments  (such as the ending of the bracero,  or 
guest  worker,  program in  1964),  but probably  depends  more on  the 
huge wage  differential  between  Mexico  and the United States than on 
U.S.  labor market developments.7  On the trade side,  the  worldwide 
movement toward more open trade, the increased productivity of work- 
ers in LDCs,  the entry of China into the world economy,  and changes 
in exchange  rates have  altered trade flows,  irrespective  of changes  in 
the U.S.  labor market. 
Immigration 
Immigration began to surge not long after the enactment of the 1965 
amendments, reversing a long downward trend in the foreign-born share 
of the U.S.  population.  Table  1 quantifies these patterns. In 1960,  5.4 
percent of the population  was foreign-born;  in  1970,  the foreign-born 
share bottomed out at 4.8  percent. Between  1970 and 1996, the number 
of  foreign-born  persons  increased  by  15 million,  raising  the foreign- 
6.  Borjas  (1990, chap. 2) provides  a brief summary  of the policy changes initiated 
by the 1965 legislation. 
7.  In particular,  the illegal flow has certainly  not been motivated  by rising  real  wages 
for less skilled workers  in the United States. Those wages have fallen in recent years. 
Hanson  and Spilimbergo  (1997) show that illegal immigration  from  Mexico (as proxied 
by border  apprehensions)  is particularly  sensitive to labor  market  conditions  in Mexico. George  J.  Borjas,  Richard B.  Freeman,  and Lawrence  F.  Katz  5 
Figure 1. Percentage  of Adult Population  that Was Foreign  Born, 1950-9Oa 
Percent 
25 
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10  -  Other immigrant 
5  - - -  ---  Other states 
.  II 
1960  1970  1980 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on data  from the census Public Use Microdata  Sample (PUMS) (various  years); see table 2 
below for details. 
a. Adults are aged eighteen to sixty-four. 
b. New York,  New Jersey,  Illinois, Florida,  and  Texas. 
born share of the U.S.  population to 7.9 percent in 1990 and 9.3 percent 
in 1996.  During this period,  the proportion of immigrants from LDCs 
was rising. 
Historically,  immigrants have clustered  in a small  number of  geo- 
graphic areas, and this concentration has increased over time.  In 1960, 
60  percent  of  immigrants  lived  in  one  of  the  six  main  immigrant- 
receiving  states: California,  New  York,  Texas,  Florida,  New  Jersey, 
and Illinois.  By  1990,  75  percent of  immigrants lived  in these  states, 
and over 33 percent lived in California alone.  This geographic concen- 
tration reflects the propensity of immigrants to enter the United States 
through a limited  number of  gateway  cities  or states  and spread out 
slowly  to  other  areas of  the  country  in  subsequent  years.8  Figure  1 
illustrates the impact of the immigrant supply shock on the percent of 
8.  Bartel (1989). 6  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
the adult population (aged eighteen to sixty-four)  that was foreign-born 
in California,  in other immigrant-receiving  states,  and in the rest of the 
country over the period  1950-90.  Before  1970,  the foreign-born share 
was  stable or declining  in each region.  Between  1970  and 1990,  this 
share  almost  tripled  in California  (rising  from  10.3  percent  to  26.8 
percent),  almost doubled in the other immigrant-receiving  states (from 
8.4  to  14.6  percent),  and rose slightly  in the rest of the country (from 
3.0  to 4.2  percent). 
The effect  of  immigration on native labor depends critically  on the 
distribution of  skills  between  immigrants and natives.  If the skill  dis- 
tribution of  immigrants matches that of  natives,  immigration  will  not 
affect the relative supply of skills and thus will not change the structure 
of  wages.  By  contrast,  if  immigrants  are  less  skilled  than  natives, 
immigration  will  shift  the  distribution  of  income  toward  the  more 
skilled,  and conversely  if immigrants are more skilled  than natives. 
Table 2 compares the distributions of years of  schooling  for immi- 
grants and natives  in the United States and in California for  1990 and 
1995,  and also reports the immigrant contribution to the labor supply 
of  workers with  different  years of  schooling.  The distribution of  im- 
migrants by educational  attainment is more dispersed  than that of  na- 
tives.  A disproportionately high number of immigrants have fewer than 
nine  years  of  schooling,  but also,  a disproportionately  high  number 
have more than sixteen  years of schooling.  On average,  however,  im- 
migrants have fewer years of schooling  than natives-a  difference  that 
has grown over the past two decades,  as the mean years of  schooling 
in the immigrant population increased less rapidly than the mean years 
of schooling  of natives.  As a result,  the immigrant contribution to the 
supply  of  skills  has  become  increasingly  concentrated  in  the  lower 
educational  categories.  By  1995,  one-half  of workers with fewer than 
nine years of schooling  and one-third of workers with fewer than twelve 
years of schooling  were immigrants. 
In 1995, over 30 percent of the working-age population in California 
was  foreign-born;  consequently,  one  can  learn  much  by  comparing 
California's  experience  with that of other states.  California has an ex- 
ceptionally  large  less  educated  immigrant  population  that  stands  in 
contrast to the high number of well-educated  natives.  The lower panel 
of table 2 shows  that by  1995,  90  percent of Californians  with fewer George  J.  Borjas,  Richard B.  Freeman,  and Lawrence  F.  Katz  7 
Table 2.  Distribution  of Natives and Immigrants  by Educational  Attainment, 
United  States  and California,  1990 and  1995 
Percent 
1990 census data  1995 CPS data 
Region and  Immigrant  Immigratit 
vears of  share in  share in 
schoolinig  Natives  Immigrants  skill group  Natives  Immigrants  skill group 
United States 
Fewer than 9  4.2  22.4  36.9  2.8  22.6  49.6 
9to  II  14.0  16.0  11.1  9.9  12.3  13.1 
12  32.0  20.1  6.4  34.6  24.8  8.0 
13 to 15  29.5  21.1  7.2  30.0  19.0  7.1 
16  13.8  12.0  8.6  15.7  13.5  9.4 
More than 16  6.6  8.4  12.1  7.1  7.8  11.7 
California 
Fewer than 9  2.2  28.6  82.6  1.5  30.3  90.1 
9 to  11  11.9  17.4  34.8  7.7  14.3  44.6 
12  24.0  16.7  20.3  26.8  21.7  26.1 
13 to 15  37.5  20.5  16.7  37.9  17.6  16.8 
16  16.4  11.0  19.7  17.7  11.2  21.7 
More than 16  7.9  5.8  21.2  8.5  5.0  20.3 
Source: Authors' calculations.  Data for 1990 are from the Census Bureau's Public Use Microdata Sample. Data for 1995 
are from the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) files from the Census Bureau's Current  Population Survey (CPS). 
Throughout the paper, the authors use census and CPS data released in electronic form by the Census Bureau. 
a. First two columns under each data set give,  for the United States and California, the percentage of native-born persons 
or immigrants, aged eighteen to sixty-four, who have the given number  of years of schooling. Third column under  each data 
set gives  the percentage of persons with the given educational attainment who are immigrants. Immigrants are those born 
abroad who are noncitizens or naturalized citizens.  All others are natives. 
than nine years of  schooling  and 68 percent of those  with fewer  than 
twelve  years of schooling  were foreign-born.9 
Table 3 examines  the distribution of immigrants and natives  by oc- 
cupation and industry. The first two columns of data report the percent 
distribution of  native  and immigrant workers among occupations  and 
industries nationwide.  If immigrants were randomly distributed by oc- 
cupation  and industry,  the  figures  in these  two  columns  would  be 
9.  It is worth emphasizing  that the U.S.  labor market  does not value natives and 
immigrants  with the same educational  attainment  identically. In fact, the 1990 census 
indicates  that there is roughly  a 0. 10 log point gap between  the earnings  of natives and 
immigrants  with the same number  of years  of schooling. As a result, simple head  counts 
of immigrants  will exaggerate  their  contribution  to labor  supply.  A more  accurate  picture 
is obtained  by counting  immigrants  and natives in terms  of efficiency units. Below, we 
calculate  the contributions  that "equivalent" immigrants  make  to labor  supply. S~~~~~~~~~f 
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roughly  the same.  They  are not.  As the ratios of the immigrant share 
to  the  native  share  in  the  third column  show,  immigrants  are more 
concentrated  in  lower  skill  occupations  than natives  and work  in  a 
different set of industries.  There are relatively  more immigrants work- 
ing in farming occupations,  in service jobs,  as private household work- 
ers,  and as operators and fabricators.  There are relatively  more immi- 
grants  in  agriculture,  in  manufacturing,  and in  wholesale  and retail 
trade. Immigrants are less  likely  than natives  to work in white  collar 
jobs-such  as managerial and professional  specialties,  administrative 
support,  sales  and technical  support-and  are especially  underrepre- 
sented  in government jobs.  In part these  differences  are due to lower 
educational attainment, but some of them cannot be so easily explained. 
The last two columns  of table 3 record the proportion of immigrants 
in different  occupations  and industries,  for the United  States  and for 
California.  The figures for the entire country provide  another way  of 
showing  the concentration of immigrants in low-skill  occupations  and 
selected industries. The figures for California emphasize the importance 
of  immigration  in that state's  economy.  In some  occupations,  such as 
farming,  private household,  and operators and fabricators,  about half 
or more of  California's  work force  consists  of  immigrants.  In  1995, 
immigrants  made  up 68.3  percent  of  its  agricultural work force  and 
41.3  percent of its manufacturing work force.  These  numbers suggest 
that immigration may have affected  the industrial structure of Califor- 
nia.  Between  1970  and 1990,  the proportion of  workers employed  in 
immigrant-intensive  industries  fell  by  only  4. 1  percentage  points 
(8  percent)  in  California,  as compared  with  an 8.6  percentage  point 
(16 percent) decline  in nonimmigrant states,  and a 9.4 percentage point 
(20 percent) decline  in the other immigrant-receiving  states.  '0 The frac- 
tion of California's  workers employed  in the private household industry 
fell  less  than in other states,  and the fraction employed  in apparel and 
accessories  rose in California but declined elsewhere.  To the extent that 
the industries spurred by immigration compete  with similar industries 
located elsewhere  in the country (as might be the case for manufacturing 
and, possibly,  agriculture),  the observed  change  in industry mix pro- 
10.  We define immigrant-intensive  industries as those  with a larger share of  immi- 
grants than the national  average  immigrant share of  total employment;  these  comprise 
personal services  (including  private household  services),  agriculture, business and repair 
services,  retail trade, and manufacturing. 10  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
vides  yet another potential means by which the effects  of immigration 
are diffused  across the country. 
Finally,  while  many immigrants work in manufacturing, many also 
work in nontraded sectors.  The significant  immigrant representation in 
services  and retail  trade highlights  a critical  difference  between  the 
potential  effects  of  trade and of  immigration on native workers.  Less 
skilled  natives  can  escape  trade competition  with  low-paid  workers 
overseas by specializing  in the production of nontraded goods; the local 
sales clerk must live in the United States to deal with customers.  Indeed, 
when  no American  competes  with the Chinese  in producing low-cost 
children's toys,  increased imports of those toys benefit even less skilled 
Americans.  But there is no such "cone  of diversification"  escape  that 
allows  native  workers to  avoid  competition  from  immigrants.  Immi- 
grants can just as easily  work in nontraded goods  and services  as in the 
traded goods  sector. 
Trade 
The upper panel of figure 2 shows that the most widely used measure 
of trade, the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP,  increased markedly 
from 1970 to 1980,  stabilized  in the 1980s,  and has risen since  1990."l 
While  much of the growth in the  1970s  was trade between  the United 
States and other advanced countries,  the share of  imports from LDCs 
(defined  in this  figure as all nonindustrial countries,  exclusive  of  the 
petroleum  producing  countries)  has increased  continuously  since  the 
1970s,  accelerating  in the  1990s. I2 The bottom panel of figure 2 shows 
that the ratio of  imports from LDCs  to U.S.  GDP rose from 0.023  in 
1980 to 0.028  in 1990 and to 0.041  in 1996.  Nearly 40 percent of U.S. 
11. The ratio (EX +  IM)/GDP  exaggerates  the relative  magnitude  of trade,  because 
EX (exports) and IM (imports)  are measured  in terms of sales, while GDP is a value- 
added concept. Sales are roughly twice GDP, so that a consistent indicator  of the 
magnitude  of trade in terms of the traded  proportion  of sales would be about half of 
(EX +  IM)/GDP. Since the ratio  of sales to GDP has not changed  much  over time, the 
growth of (EX  +  IM)/GDP  roughly tracks the growth of (EX  +  IM)/sales. 
12. We classify countries  on the basis of their level of economic  development  when 
the implicit supply shock began, in the 1970s or 1980s. As a result, Japan  is classified 
as an industrial  nation, but the four "tigers" (Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan)  are classified as LDCs. On the questions  of whether  to treat  Japan  in the 1960s 
as advanced  and whether  to treat  some of the tigers as advanced  economies today, see 
Sachs and Shatz (1994). George J. Borjas, Richard  B. Freeman, and Lawrence  F. Katz  11 
Figure 2. Growing  Openness  and LDC Trade,  1970-96a 
Ratio 
0.17  -To  tal trade/GDPb 
0.15- 
0.13- 
0.11  _ 
0.09 
0.04 
0.03  LDC imports/GDP 
0.02  _ 
J 
,  X  LDC exports/GDP 
0.01 
1975  1980  1985  1990  1995 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on data  from the Economnic  Report  of the President, 1997. 
a. LDC trade flows include those with trading partners  other than Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, 
members  of the Organization  of Petroleum  Exporting  Countries,  and the countries  of western  Europe. 
b. Exports  plus imports  divided by GDP. 12  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
imports came from LDCs in 1996,  and the largest trade deficit was with 
China, whose  goods  made up 6 percent of imports. 
The effect  of imports and exports on workers depends on the char- 
acteristics  of  workers in those  industries affected  by trade. If import- 
intensive  industries  disproportionately  use  less  skilled  workers  and 
export-intensive  industries disproportionately use more skilled workers, 
trade will  shift  the distribution of  income  from the less  skilled  to the 
more skilled. 13 Table 4 shows how the average characteristics of work- 
ers in American manufacturing industries in 1990 differed along trade 
lines  calculated  in two  different  ways.  The  lines  listed  as import- or 
export-weighted  averages weight the characteristics of workers in each 
industry by the ratio of imports (or exports) to sales times the employ- 
ment in the industry. The lines listed as high export or import intensity 
are obtained by ranking manufacturing industries by the ratio of exports 
or  imports  to  sales,  and  then  selecting  off  the  top  of  the  list  until 
10 percent of the manufacturing labor force is represented. The figures 
given  for LDC  import or export  intensity  are calculated  in a similar 
manner, using LDC imports and exports to weight or categorize  indus- 
tries. For the rest of the economy,  we differentiate between agriculture, 
which  is a major exporter,  and "all  other"  industries: services,  trade, 
and government.  Despite  the growing  international trade in services, 
the "all other" category can be roughly viewed  as the nontraded sector 
for the purpose of comparison  with manufacturing. 
The table shows  that in the manufacturing sector,  the workers most 
affected by imports are disproportionately immigrants, women,  blacks, 
and the less  educated; whereas those most affected  by exports are dis- 
proportionately  native-born,  nonblack,  and educated men.  Moreover, 
the wages of workers in the top 10 percent of importing industries were 
0.53  log point below  the wages of those in the top 10 percent of export 
industries,  and the wages  of the  "average"  import worker were 0.15 
log  point  less  than those  of  the average  export worker.  Classified  by 
imports and exports with LDCs alone,  the skill (wage)  composition  of 
the  import-affected  workers  and the  skill  composition  of  the export- 
affected  workers differ even  more. 
Looking  beyond  the manufacturing sector,  however,  the picture is 
13.  Trefler (1993)  discusses  the difficulties  involved  in calculating  relative  factor 
proportions. ,  o  ooIt  It  CN01.  cr  C  r n-  c  cN 
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more complex.  Agriculture  uses  low-wage  male  workers to a greater 
extent than even the top 10 percent of importing industries in manufac- 
turing.  In the heterogeneous  "all  other"  category,  the proportion of 
women exceeds  that in the average import sector; and the proportion of 
college  graduates exceeds  that in the average export sector. The differ- 
ent composition  of the labor force in exporting and importing industries 
has  two  implications  for  trade-based  explanations  of  changes  in  the 
U.S.  job market. First, the fact that women are disproportionately con- 
centrated in industries that import from LDCs suggests  that LDC trade 
should have affected women more adversely than men. But rates of pay 
and employment  for women have risen since  1970.  The evidence  thus 
suggests  that there is something wrong with models in which the traded 
goods  sector  determines  wages  for  women  throughout the economy. 
The expansion  of  the  "all  other"  category,  which  disproportionately 
employs  women,  can explain  this seeming  paradox in a more general 
model of wage determination.  Second,  the large and increasing differ- 
ence  between  the  skill  mix  of  the top and bottom  importing  and ex- 
porting industries raises the possibility  that trade may have particular 
adverse effects  on the economic  position of some less skilled workers. '4 
The Impact of Immigration: Area Studies 
Suppose  (1)  that immigrant flows  are uncorrelated with  economic 
conditions  in an area; and (2) that natives do not alter decisions  about 
location  or capital investment  in response  to immigration.  Then com- 
paring native outcomes  or changes  in outcomes  between  areas of more 
immigration  and areas of  less  would  offer  a good  way  to isolate  the 
impact  of  immigration  on  natives.  '  Put differently,  one  knows  that 
immigrants  flock  to  California.  Why  not just  compare  labor market 
14. While table 4 shows data for 1990, we have also calculated  the equivalent  data 
for 1980;  we find  that  the differentiation  between  the top 10 percent  of import  and  export 
sectors increased  between 1980 and 1990. One reason  for this finding  is that  LDCs were 
more dominant  in the high-import intensity sectors in 1990 than in 1980. Another  is 
that  the automobile  industry  (a large  high-wage  industry)  was a more  significant  importer 
in 1980 than in 1990. 
15. Grossman  (1982) represents  the first application  of this approach.  Her finding 
of a near zero correlation  between native wages and immigrant  penetration  in a local 
labor  market  has been confirmed  by most studies in this literature. George  J.  Borjas,  Richard B.  Freeman,  and Lawrence  F.  Katz  15 
outcomes  in  California  to  the  outcomes  observed  in  the  rest  of  the 
country? 
The problem with contrasting native outcomes  between  immigrant- 
intensive  areas and nonimmigrant areas is that neither proposition  1 nor 
2 appears to be valid for the United  States.  The cities  or states where 
immigrants cluster have done well in some periods and poorly in others, 
producing a potentially  spurious correlation between  immigration  and 
area outcomes.  For reasons that are probably unrelated to immigration, 
California is a high-wage  state. As a result, immigration will appear to 
improve native economic  opportunities in a cross-section  dominated by 
California.  To  avoid  this  spurious cross-sectional  spatial correlation, 
most analysts relate the change  in the economic  position  of natives  in 
an area over time to the change  in the number of immigrants. I6 Bu.  a 
state's  economy  also fluctuates over time for reasons that are indepen- 
dent of  immigration,  creating the possibility  of  spurious longitudinal 
correlations  as well.  When California's  economy  booms,  there will be 
a positive  correlation between  immigration and the economic  position 
of natives; in a recession,  the correlation will  be negative.  Elsewhere, 
we report that the time-varying  conditions  of individual  states lead to 
unstable  estimates  of  immigrant effects  on native  outcomes.'7  If one 
had perfect measures of how economic  conditions change within a state 
and affect  relative  wages  across  skill  groups,  one  would  be  able  to 
control for those conditions  and isolate the effect  of immigration.  Such 
measures,  however,  are not available. 
Another problem with area analysis  is that natives may adjust to the 
immediate  impact of  immigration  in an area by moving  their labor or 
capital to other localities  until native wages  and returns to capital are 
equalized  across  areas.  For example,  a large immigrant flow  arriving 
in Los Angeles  might well result in fewer unskilled workers from Mis- 
sissippi  or Michigan  moving  to California and a reallocation  of capital 
from those states to California. A comparison of the wage of less skilled 
natives between California and other states, therefore, might show little 
difference  because the effects  of immigration were diffused  around the 
economy,  not because  immigration had no economic  effects. 
16. See,  for example, Altonji and Card (1991); LaLonde  and Topel (1991), and 
Schoeni (1996). 
17. Borjas, Freeman,  and Katz (1996). 16  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
Regional  Differences  in Native  Wages and Employment 
We  examine  the  link  between  immigration  and  native  outcomes 
across  areas for the periods  1960-70,  1970-80,  and  1980-90,  using 
data extracts from the  1960,  1970,  1980,  and 1990 Public Use  Micro- 
data Samples (PUMS)  of the decennial census.  The extracts include all 
persons aged eighteen  to sixty-four  (as of the census  year) who do not 
live in group quarters. In the 1960 and 1970 censuses,  the data extracts 
are a  1 percent random sample  of  the population.  In  1980 and  1990, 
the immigrant extracts form a 5 percent random sample and the native 
extracts  form  a  1 percent random sample.  We  define  a person  as an 
immigrant if he or she was born abroad and is either a noncitizen  or a 
naturalized citizen;  all other persons are classified  as natives.  Because 
immigrants  are concentrated  in particular educational  groups,  we  ex- 
amine  the  impact  of  immigration  on  the  labor  market outcomes  of 
natives  in five  educational  categories,  or  "skill  groups":  fewer  than 
nine years of schooling,  nine to eleven  years,  twelve  years, thirteen to 
fifteen years,  and at least sixteen  years. 
The labor market is likely to respond to supply shocks with price and 
quantity adjustments.  Our measures of labor market outcomes  are log 
weekly  earnings  and log  annual earnings  from the previous  calendar 
year and the probability of working during the census week.  The anal- 
ysis of the employment probability uses all the observations in our data, 
while  the analysis  of weekly  or annual earnings uses the subsample of 
persons  who  worked  for pay  at some  time  in the year preceding  the 
census,  were  not  self-employed,  and were  working  in  the  civilian 
sector. 
The  geographic  scope  of  the  labor  market in  question  can  affect 
estimates  of the impact of immigration.  Studies of a small geographic 
area are more likely to miss effects  of immigration than studies of large 
areas because native migration and capital responses may diffuse those 
effects  in small areas. We use three alternative definitions  of the geo- 
graphic area: metropolitan areas, states, and census regions.  An advan- 
tage of using states or regions as the geographic unit is that data at these 
levels  are available for the entire period 1960-90.  We limit the analysis 
of metropolitan areas to the 1980 and 1990 censuses,  across which 236 
metropolitan areas can be matched.  The  1970 census  PUMS identifies 
far fewer metropolitan areas and the 1960 PUMS does not identify any. George  J.  Borjas,  Richard B.  Freeman,  and Lawrence  F.  Katz  17 
We use age-adjusted measures of labor market outcomes,  estimated 
separately for male and female U.S.  natives.  We purge our data of age 
effects  in the following  way.  Let yil,k be the labor market outcome  for 
person  i,  residing  in  area j,  belonging  to  skill  group  k,  in  census 
year t; and let Zi k, be a vector of dummy variables indicating  whether 
the worker is aged eighteen  to twenty-four,  twenty-five  to thirty-four, 
thirty-five  to forty-four,  forty-five  to fifty-four,  or fifty-five  to  sixty- 
four. Finally,  let rj., be a fixed effect giving the age-adjusted "average" 
labor market outcome  experienced  by a native who lives  in area j  and 
belongs  to  skill  group  k  in  year  t.  We  then  estimate  the  following 
regression  separately for each native group based on sex and education 
in each census  year: 
(1)  Yikjt  Z  jZk,".k  +  rjkt  +  Uikt,, 
where u  j.,t is the error term, assumed uncorrelated with the independent 
variables  in  the  model.  The  age-adjusted  measures  of  outcomes  are 
given  by the fixed effects  r, evaluated  at the mean age distribution of 
the native sample from the pooled  1970,  1980,  and 1990 censuses. 
We  use  the  estimated  fixed  effects  r  to  calculate  first difference 
estimates of changes in the labor market outcome for each sex-education 
group. We define the change in outcome  for a particular sex-education 
group in a particular region as 
(2)  Arjkt  =  rjkt,-j,k_,t- 
Table 5 summarizes the key patterns in our data, in terms of regres- 
sion  coefficients  linking  changes  in wages  or immigration  from  one 
decade to the next. The first and third rows report the results of regress- 
ing the change  in age-adjusted  log  weekly  earnings in the  1980s for a 
state-education  cell  on the change in log weekly  earnings in the  1970s 
for the same state-education  cell. I8 The regression  includes a vector of 
education  fixed effects;  by including  these,  we isolate  the secular cor- 
relation in wage growth within an educational group. The results reveal 
a  strong negative  relation  in  wage  growth  by  state between  the two 
periods.  The coefficient  in the male regression is  -  1, implying a com- 
plete reversal in the ranking of states by wage growth between the 1970s 
18.  The wage  growth regressions  are weighted  by (n,  n .)I(n,  +  n),  where n, gives 
the sample size in year t, and x and y are the years spanned  by the period  defining  the 
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Table 5. State Cross-Section  Autoregressions  Estimating  Changes  in Native Earnings 
Growth and Immigrant  Flows  between  Census  Decadesa 
Dependent  Independent 
Sample  variable  variable  Coefficient  R2 
Males  Wage growth,  1980-90  Wage growth,  1970-80  -  1.052  0.640 
(0.068) 
Wage growth,  1970-80  Wage growth,  1960-70  0.002  0.149 
(0.084) 
Females  Wage growth,  1980-90  Wage growth,  1970-80  -0.591  0.438 
(0.073) 
Wage growth,  1970-80  Wage growth,  1960-70  0.179  0.456 
(0.058) 
All persons  Immigrant supply  Immigrant supply  1.498  0.753 
change,  1980-90  change,  1970-80  (0.054) 
Immigrant supply  Immigrant supply  1.251  0.500 
change,  1970-80  change,  1960-70  (0.098) 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the census PUMS (various years). 
a. Wage growth is defined as the log change in age-adjusted weekly earnings: rkt  -  ,rjk,t  1t,  from equation 2 in the text, 
where j represents one of the fifty states or the District of Columbia and k represents one of the five skill groups described 
in the text. Change in the immigrant supply, from equation 3 in the text, is (Mjk,  -  Mj.k,,t-  1O)NiNA,k.,-  1,  where Mjk  and Njk 
are the number of immigrants and natives, respectively,  in the given state and skill group. Regressions include fixed effects 
identifying each skill group. Standard  errors are shown in parentheses. Each regression contains 255 observations. 
and the 1980s. Figure 3, which compares  rates of growth of wages by 
state in the census data, illustrates  this striking  pattern.  '9 
When we obtained this result, we  initially wondered if  it might 
largely reflect measurement  error;  the log of the 1980 weekly wage 
enters each side of the regression  equation  with opposite sign. This is 
not the case. We estimate  an analogous  regression  using 1970-80 wage 
growth as the dependent variable and 1960-70  wage growth as the 
independent  variable.  This regression,  reported  in the second  and  fourth 
rows of table 5 and illustrated  in figure  3, shows no correlation  in wage 
growth  for men between the two decades and a positive correlation  for 
women.20 We next wondered  whether  the result was due to some pe- 
19. The figure "aggregates" the data  across skill groups  in a state by weighting  the 
wages of workers  with different  levels of schooling  by the national  proportion  of workers 
in each educational  group. 
20.  Although the regional structure  of wage growth changed over the period, the 
correlation  matrix  in wage levels indicates  that  these are strongly  and positively corre- 
lated  over time. Every  single element in the wage level correlation  matrix,  for both men 
and women, over the period 1960-90 exceeds 0.91,  where the matrix  of correlation 
coefficients  is weighted  by the sample  size in the state-education  cell in the 1990  census. George J. Borjas, Richard  B. Freeman, and Lawrence  F. Katz  19 
Figure  3. The Changing  Regional  Wage  Structurea 
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culiarity in the census data. However,  we reestimated these regressions 
using  establishment  data on  average  log  weekly  wages  for  workers 
covered  by  each  state's  unemployment  insurance  system  and  again 
found a strong negative  correlation between  wage  growth by state in 
the 1970s and in the  1980s. 
The fact that the high-wage  growth states of the 1970s became low- 
wage growth states in the 1980s has a crucial implication  for any anal- 
ysis that exploits  spatial differences  to infer the effects  of immigration 
on  native  outcomes.  Since  the  states  that received  large numbers of 
immigrants in the  1970s also received  large numbers of immigrants in 
the 1980s, the reversal of wage growth among states implies a reversal in 
the sign of the correlation between changes in wages and in immigration 
by state. As  a result, one's  inferences about the impact of  immigration 
will almost certainly differ according to the period analyzed. 
Formally,  let M,,., be the number of  immigrants (both male and fe- 
male) who live  in region j and belong  to skill group k in census  year t, 
and let N,., be the number of  (male  and female)  natives  in that region 
and skill group. We define the change in labor supply due to immigra- 
tion during the decade that ends in year t as 
(3)  At  J  ,  k, t 
kj,k,t-  10 
The fifth row of table 5 reports the results of regressing  the change  in 
the immigrant  supply  over  1980-90  on the change  in the  immigrant 
supply over  1970-80,  including  a vector of education  fixed effects  to 
isolate  changes  within  educational  groups.  The  regression  shows  a 
strong positive  correlation between the growth of immigrants in a state 
in the 1970s and the growth of immigrants in that state in the 1980s.  In 
the sixth row,  we  lag the regression  by one decade; the correlation in 
supply shocks between  the  1960s  and the  1970s is also positive  and is 
almost as strong. 
The data thus indicate that immigration induced large supply shocks 
in the same states in the  1970s  and in the  1980s.  But they  also  show 
that the states that experienced  high wage growth in the  1970s experi- 
enced low wage growth in the 1980s. The result is a reversal in the sign 
of the correlation between changes in immigration by state and changes 
in wages.  The correlation between  /\m and /\r  by state switches  from 
-0.19  in  1970-80  to 0.34  in  1980-90  for men,  and from  -0.18  to George  J. Borjas,  Richard B.  Freeman,  and Lawrence  F.  Katz  21 
0.44  for  women.  Studies  that calculate  spatial  correlations  between 
wage  growth and immigrant supply  shocks  will  not be able to obtain 
consistently  negative or positive effects  across different censuses  unless 
they can control for the forces  that caused the regional  wage  structure 
to change so dramatically over time. These unobserved structural forces 
are so  strong that a consistent  impact of  immigration,  if  such exists, 
probably cannot be detected  in an analysis  of interarea differences. 
In view  of this observation,  it is not surprising that our analysis  of 
regional differences  in wage trends show little systematic evidence  that 
the immigrant supply  shock had an impact on the weekly  earnings of 
natives.  For simplicity,  we divide the country into three regions: Cali- 
fornia,  the other five  states that receive  large numbers of  immigrants 
(New  York, Texas,  Florida, New Jersey, and Illinois),  and the remain- 
der of the country. 
Table  6  reports log  weekly  earnings  in  each  of  these  regions  for 
natives  in  each  educational  group  relative  to  natives  with  exactly 
twelve  years of education in the given region,  from 1960 to 1990.21  For 
almost every educational group, the pattern of wage differentials moves 
similarly  in California,  the other immigrant-receiving  states,  and the 
nonimmigrant  states.  Consider,  for  example,  native  men  who  have 
between  nine and eleven  years of schooling.  In 1990,  this group made 
up 14.0  percent of native adults. Native  men in this educational  group 
who lived  in California earned 0.08  log  point less  than natives  with a 
high  school  diploma  in  1960  and 0.19  log  point  less  in  1990.  Their 
counterparts in the other immigrant-receiving  states  earned 0. 12 log 
point less than natives with a high school diploma in 1960 and 0.24  log 
point  less  in  1990.  The trend in the relative  wage  of  this  skill  group 
was similar in the states that had few  immigrants:  -0.13  log point in 
1960 and -0.24  log point in 1990. Thus from 1960 to 1990, the relative 
wage  of  this less  skilled  group of  native  men declined  by about 0.11 
log  point in each of the regions,  even  though the immigrant shock to 
California was disproportionately less skilled.  The natural "difference- 
in-difference"  estimate of the immigrant wage effect-the  wage growth 
of  California's  natives  less  the wage  growth of  natives  in the nonim- 
migrant states-suggests  that immigration  did not affect  native  wage 
21.  The fixed effects for the aggregated  regions are obtained  by "adding up" rik, 
over the states in the region, with each state's observation  weighted by the number  of 
working  natives in that  state in the given census year. 22  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
Table  6. Relative  Log Weekly  Earnings of Natives by Skill Group, 1960-90 
Log indexa 
Males  Females 
Other  Other 
Years of  immigrant  Other  immigrant  Other 
schooling  Year  California  states"  states  California  statesb  states 
Fewer  than  9  1960  -0.215  -0.344  -0.383  -0.357  -0.395  -0.510 
1970  -0.193  -0.345  -0.359  -0.336  -0.331  -0.384 
1980  -0.194  -0.359  -0.361  -0.163  -0.271  -0.268 
1990  - 0.331  - 0.366  - 0.343  -0.208  - 0.374  - 0.285 
9 to II  1960  -0.084  -0.120  -0.128  -0.196  -0.216  -0.247 
1970  -0.111  -0.175  -0.175  -0.208  -0.220  -0.220 
1980  -0.176  -0.212  -0.219  -0.207  -0.204  -0.186 
1990  -0.187  -0.235  -0.239  -0.215  -0.239  -0.218 
13to 15  1960  0.059  0.081  0.085  0.043  0.115  0.129 
1970  0.061  0.081  0.077  0.091  0.134  0.112 
1980  0.052  0.062  0.046  0.068  0.113  0.097 
1990  0.089  0.100  0.083  0.127  0.153  0.156 
16 or more  1960  0.271  0.308  0.305  0.439  0.510  0.544 
1970  0.313  0.374  0.334  0.500  0.565  0.589 
1980  0.280  0.322  0.262  0.362  0.446  0.428 
1990  0.414  0.463  0.410  0.513  0.579  0.558 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data froin the census PUMS (various years). 
a. Log of index constructed so that log earnings of natives with exactly twelve years of schooling  =  0 in each sample 
year and region. 
b. New York, New Jersey, Illinois,  Florida, and Texas. 
differentials.  The one exception  to this pattern is native men who have 
less  than nine years of schooling,  which is an extremely  small group. 
The  raw  data thus  suggest  that it  is  extremely  difficult  to  obtain 
consistent  estimates  of  the  labor market effects  of  immigration  from 
spatial correlations.  Our efforts to find such effects  support this infer- 
ence.  Consider the regression  model 
(4)  &jk  t a,  +  ,  Amk,  +  Vj +  Tk  +  Ujl,, 
where v, is a fixed effect  indicating the group's area of residence  and Tk 
is  a  fixed  effect  indicating  the  group's  educational  attainment.  The 
education  fixed  effects  net  out  any  change  occurring  in  the  national 
market for workers with that level  of  education,  while  the area fixed 
effects  net out the impact of the level  of state economic  activity  on all 
natives residing  in that state. They represent our best effort to control George  J.  Borjas,  Richard B.  Freeman,  and Lawrence  F.  Katz  23 
for factors unrelated to immigration that might affect outcomes  across 
groups and states. 
We measure the immigration supply shock as the change in the size 
of  the  immigrant  population  relative  to  the  native  population  at the 
beginning of the decade (see equation 3). This measure differs from the 
first difference  in the foreign-born  share of the work force that is used 
in many area studies of immigration. It avoids the potential endogeneity 
of the immigration variable due to the possibility  that the native popu- 
lation  at the end of  the decade  depends  on immigration,  and also  the 
potential endogeneity  of labor force participation (of both immigrants 
and natives) to the immigrant supply shock.22 Finally,  we use the supply 
shock  in the  specific  educational  group as the measure of  immigrant 
penetration. This variable helps us to better capture the "own"  effects 
in the data.23 
Table 7 presents our estimates of the coefficient  1, from the 1960-90 
census  data. There is a great deal of variation in the estimated  coeffi- 
cients  by  scope  of  geographic  area,  sex,  and time  period,  making  it 
difficult  to draw any robust generalization  about the effects  of  immi- 
gration on labor market outcomes.24 Consider,  for example,  the rela- 
tionship  between  immigration and the employment  probability for na- 
tive  men.  The  regression  coefficients  for  the  1980s  suggest  that 
immigrant supply shocks lead to lower employment for native workers, 
and that this effect  becomes  more negative,  the greater the scope of the 
geographic  area. At the regional  level,  the regressions  suggest  that a 
10 percentage  point increase  in the relative  number of immigrants re- 
22.  We replicated  the regression  analysis  using counts  of workers,  with little change 
in the underlying  results( 
23.  Although it seems as if the specification in equation 4  ignores cross-effects 
between  various  types of immigrant  workers  and  natives, the regressions  do include  area 
fixed effects. These fixed effects partly  control for the supply shock attributable  to the 
total immigrant  flow into an area. We also experimented  with alternative  specifications 
of the regressions that allowed for an "own effect"  as well as some cross-effects. 
However, the correlation  between the own supply shock and the total supply shock is 
typically  above 0.7, so that  the data  do not allow a reliable  estimation  of a more  general 
model. 
24.  In Borjas,  Freeman,  and  Katz  (1996) we note that  analysis  of native  wage growth 
in the 1980s shows that the spatial  correlation  became  more negative  as the geographic 
area  under  consideration  was expanded. Table 7, however, indicates  that the negative 
correlation  between the regression coefficients and the scope of the geographic area 
disappears  in earlier  decades, in particular,  in the 1960s. OC  rn  tr)  tr  all  00  m  -i 
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duces  the  employment-to-population  ratio  of  natives  by  about  0.45 
percentage point.  But this coefficient  is implausibly  large and positive 
in the 1970s and implausibly  large and negative  in the 1960s.  The data 
also reveal little consistency  in the results for weekly  and annual earn- 
ings,  or for men and women. 
One  way  to  interpret the  inconsistent  spatial correlations  between 
changes  in native outcomes  and immigration over the period  1960-90 
is  that the  economic  impact  of  immigration  on  native  labor  market 
outcomes  simply changes over time or differs by sex.  That is,  we have 
the  "right"  estimates,  but they vary a great deal.  We do not believe 
that this is so.  If it were,  the historical record would provide virtually 
no information about the future effects  of immigration or of changes in 
immigration policy  on native outcomes. 
Our interpretation of the results in table 7 is that the spatial correla- 
tion between  changes  in native outcomes  and immigration  do not,  in 
fact,  measure what we want them to measure. The inconsistency  in the 
signs of the correlations over time provides little information about the 
structural impact of immigration on the native labor market. Our finding 
that the pattern of regional wage changes  has shifted dramatically over 
time-while  the  same  regions  keep  receiving  immigrants-suggests 
that unobserved  factors are driving the evolution  of the regional  wage 
structure, that these factors have little to do with immigration,  and that 
they  dominate  the data.  The one  valid  inference  from an analysis  of 
spatial  correlations  is  that immigration  is  not a major determinant of 
the regional  structure of labor market outcomes  for natives. 
Immigration and Native Internal Migration 
The fact that immigration is not consistently  related to regional labor 
market outcomes  for natives  raises  the question  of  why  immigration 
effects  are so weak at the regional level,  despite the striking geographic 
clustering of immigrants.  One hypothesis  is that the immigration effect 
is  diffused  through the internal migration  flows  of  native  workers or 
capital.  Previous research has focused on labor flows,  without reaching 
a clear consensus  of findings.  Some studies find that metropolitan areas 
where  immigrants  cluster  had lower  rates of  native  in-migration  and 
higher rates of native out-migration in the 1970s.25 David Card reports 
25.  See,  for example,  Filer (1992)  and White and Hunter (1993). 26  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
that the unexpected arrival of  120,000  Marielitos  in Miami in 1980 did 
not raise the city's  population growth over the next five years relative 
to demographic  predictions  made before the Mariel boatlift.26 Consis- 
tent with these  studies,  William  Frey and Kao-Lee  Liaw find a strong 
negative  correlation  between  immigration  and the net migration rates 
of natives in the 1990 census.27  By contrast, in a later study Card reports 
a slight  positive  correlation between  the rate of growth in the number 
of  native  workers and the rate of  growth in the number of  immigrant 
workers by metropolitan area, over the period  1985-90.28  Therefore it 
remains in question  whether native internal migration is an important 
mechanism  for diffusing  the effects  of immigration nationwide. 
We address this issue by examining  the population trends of natives 
and immigrants aged eighteen  to sixty-four,  by state,  using decennial 
census  data from  1950  to  1990.29  We  analyze  data at the state  level 
because  the  state  of  residence  is  the one  measure  of  native  location 
decisions  that is  available  in each  of  these  data sets.  As  with  wage 
outcomes,  it is instructive to compare population trends in California, 
other  immigrant-receiving  states,  and nonimmigrant  states.  Table  8 
reports the proportions of  the total population,  of  natives,  and of  im- 
migrants  living  in these  areas from  1950  to  1990.  As  shown  above, 
large-scale  immigration to the United States resumed around 1970 and 
has continued  since.  Hence  by contrasting  changes  in the residential 
location  of the native population before and after 1970,  one can assess 
the effects  of immigration on native location decisions.30 The period of 
analysis  thus spans both the preimmigration pattern of internal migra- 
tion (the "pretreatment period")  and the postimmigration  adjustments 
(the "treatment period"). 
The data reveal one important fact: up to  1970,  the share of natives 
who lived in the major immigrant-receiving  state, California, was rising 
rapidly; since  1970,  the share of natives living  in California has barely 
changed.  Between  1950 and 1970 the fraction of natives  who lived  in 
California  rose  by  2.7  percentage  points  (39  percent): between  1950 
26.  Card (1990). 
27.  Frey (1995a,  1995b); Frey and Liaw (1996). 
28.  Card (1997). 
29.  We use the sample of persons who do not reside in group quarters. 
30.  The data clearly  indicate  that the migration patterns of the U.S.  population  (as 
opposed  to cross-state  differences  in fertility  and death rates) dominate  shifts  in popu- 
lation across states; see  Blanchard and Katz (1992). l-  L- 
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and  1960  it increased  from 6.9  to 8.6  percent and between  1960 and 
1970 it increased from 8.6  to 9.6  percent.  In contrast,  the fraction of 
natives living in California rose by only 0.1  percentage point from 1970 
to 1980 and by just 0.3  point from 1980 to 1990,  a cumulative increase 
of 0.4  point (4.2  percent). 
If California's  share of the total U.S.  population had also stabilized 
between  1970 and 1990,  one would perhaps conclude that the state had 
reached  some  equilibrium  steady-state  share  of  the  population.  But 
California's  share rose  from  10.2  percent in  1970  to  12.4  percent in 
1990: a 2.2  percentage point (22 percent) increase.  In fact,  California 
shifted  from  growth  based  on  native  migration  to  growth  based  on 
immigrants.  If  the  share  of  the  native  population  in  California  had 
increased  in the  1970s  and 1980s  at the same rate as in the  1950s  and 
1960s,  12.3 percent of natives would have lived in California in 1990. 1 
An extrapolation  of the pre- 1970 demographic trends-that  is,  before 
the immigrant  supply  shock-accurately  predicts  the state's  share of 
the entire U.S.  population in 1990.32  Figure 4 shows that the data point 
for California (like the points for each of the other immigrant-receiving 
states)  lies  close  to the regression  line  linking  the population  growth 
rate  in  1970-90  to  that in  1950-70.  This  finding  suggests  that the 
increasing  number  of  immigrants  who  chose  to  settle  in  California 
displaced  the native net migration that would otherwise  have occurred 
and thus diffused  the economic  effects  of immigration from California 
to the rest of the country. 
We formalize  this insight  with a simple  regression  model.  We  de- 
fine  the  simple  annualized  population  growth  rate contributions  for 
natives,  Ani(t, t'),  and immigrants,  Ami(t, t'),  as 
Nj-  N-Nit.  (a)  Ann,  (t  t) 
L.it 
and 
31.  Extrapolating the trend over  1950-70  to this later period implies  that the native 
share would have grown by 2.7  percentage points between  1970 and 1990.  Admittedly, 
this simple exercise  assumes  away the nonlinearities  that may exist  in the rate of change 
in California's  population  share. 
32.  Evidence  provided  by  Blanchard  and Katz  (1992)  presages  this  finding:  their 
figure I shows  that California  lies on the regression  line linking the rate of employment 
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Table  9. Estimating  the Response  of State Native Population  Flows to State 
Immigrant  Population  Flowsa 
Double differences 
1970-90  1970-90 
First differences,  minus  minwus 
1970-90  1960-70  1950-70 
0.777  -0.756  -  1.673 
(0.311)  (0.278)  (0.285) 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the census PUMS (various years). 
a. For first differences specification. dependent variable is the average annual contribution of native population growth to 
overall population growth in each state; independent variable is the contribution  of immigrant  population growth. For double 
difference specifications,  the changzes  in these average anntial contributions (between periods given) are used as variables. 
For details,  see equations 7 (first differences) and 8 (double differences) in the text. Sample comprises the fifty states plus 
the District of Colunmbia,  except for the final column,  which excludes  Alaska and Hawaii. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
(6)  mp(t,  t')  =  i  (t'  - 
LJt 
where  N,, gives  the number of  natives  living  in  state j  in year t,  Mi, 
gives  the respective  number of  immigrants,  and Li, =  N.,  +  M1,. We 
then estimate  the following  first difference  regression  model: 
(7)  L\ni(70, 90)  =  a  +  b lAm,(70, 90)  +  e,, 
where  "70"  and "90"  indicate  the census  years  1970 and 1990,  re- 
spectively,  and e, is the stochastic error. This regression links the annual 
growth rate of natives in a state to the growth rate of immigrants in that 
state, both relative to the state's total population in the base year,  1970. 
Because the dependent and independent variables are scaled by the same 
factor, the coefficient  b measures the impact of an additional immigrant 
arriving in the state between  1970 and 1990 on the change in the number 
of natives  living  in that state during that period. 
The sample  contains  fifty-one  observations  (for each state plus the 
District of Columbia).  The first column in table 9 reports the estimated 
coefficient  b.33 The data reveal  a positive  and significant  relation  be- 
tween  immigration by state and change  in the size  of the native popu- 
lation.  Does  this positive  coefficient  imply that natives do not respond 
to immigration in their location  decisions,  or perhaps even respond by 
33.  All the first difference  models estimated in this section are weighted by the factor 
(n,  n/)I(n,  +  n'),  where  n, gives  the sample  size  in year t,  and x  and y are the years 
spanned by the period defining  the dependent  variable.  We  also  estimated  the models 
separately  for men and women,  with little change  in the results. George  J.  Borjas,  Richard B.  Freeman,  and Lawrence  F.  Katz  31 
moving to areas penetrated by immigrants? How can one reconcile these 
results  with  the  fact  that  native  migration  to  the  major  immigrant- 
receiving  state,  California,  effectively  ended around 1970? 
The key difference  between  the regression  model  in equation 7 and 
our earlier tabulations  is that the first difference  regression  compares 
population growth among states with different levels  of immigration in 
1970-90,  rather than native migration in a given  state before and after 
the immigrant supply shock.  The regression  estimated  in the first col- 
umn of table 9 implicitly  assumes  that each  state would  have had the 
same rate of native population  growth in the absence  of immigration, 
so  that California  and Vermont  were  on the  same  population  growth 
path. But if each state had its own growth path prior to immigration, and 
that growth path would have continued absent immigration, the regression 
gives  a misleading inference about the effects of immigration. To isolate 
the impact of  immigration on the net migration of  native workers, one 
needs a difference-in-difference comparison of how a given state's popu- 
lation grows before and after the immigrant supply shock. The following 
double difference model provides such a comparison: 
(8)  L\nJ(70, 90)  -  L\ni(60, 70) 
-  o  +  3 [L\mi(70, 90)  -  L\m,(60, 70)]  +  v;, 
where the coefficient  3 measures the impact of an increase in the num- 
ber of immigrants on the number of natives,  relative to the "preexisting 
conditions"  in the state. A useful interpretation of the double difference 
in equation 8 is that it imposes  a particular structure on the state's fixed 
effect-the  rate of  population  growth that the state was experiencing 
before the immigrant supply shock. 
The second column of table 9 reports the coefficient  from the double 
difference  model,  using  the  state's  population  growth  from  1960  to 
1970  as  the  counterfactual  control.34 Controlling  for  the  state's  pre- 
1970 population growth path changes the sign of the effect of immigra- 
tion  on  native  net  migration  from  positive  to  negative.  In fact,  the 
estimated  3 suggests  considerable  displacement  (the coefficient  is not 
significantly  different from  -  1). 
34.  The double  difference  models  are weighted  by (n,n,,n )I(n,,n  +  4n.n  +  n.n3,) 
where n, gives  the  sample  size  in  year  t,  x  and z  are the  years  that span  the  period 
defining the dependent variable (with z >  y >  x). 32  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1997 
The regression coefficient  presented in the second column essentially 
reiterates  the  descriptive  results  presented  in  table  8.  The  negative 
coefficient  reflects the facts that California experienced  the largest im- 
migrant supply shock and that its native population share stopped grow- 
ing when the supply shock began.  The third column of the table rees- 
timates  the double  difference  model  using  the annualized  population 
growth rate over  1950-70  to control for conditions  in the state before 
the immigrant supply shock.  This regression  yields  an even more neg- 
ative  coefficient-indeed,  it seems  too  negative,  because  it is  larger 
than one  in  absolute  value.  This  "excess  sensitivity"  is  probably  a 
functional  form issue.  It is unclear whether,  in the absence  of  an im- 
migration shock, California's  share of the native population would have 
grown  at the rapid rate of  1.4  percentage  points  per decade  that pre- 
vailed over 1950-70.  The only term in the regression that would capture 
this  possible  nonlinearity  is  the  change  in  the rate of  growth  of  the 
immigrant population. 
Table 9 demonstrates that the sign of the impact of immigration on 
the growth of the native population  depends critically  on the counter- 
factual implicit  or explicit  in a particular regression  model.  While the 
data support the inclusion  of a lagged native population growth rate in 
the model  linking  native  net migration to immigration,  this is not the 
reason why  we  prefer this model.35 Selection  of  a model depends  not 
simply on statistical results, but on the economic  relevance of the coun- 
terfactual that it poses.  We contrast native growth rates before and after 
the  immigrant  supply  shock  because  this  comparison  may  provide  a 
plausible  answer to the question  of  what would  have happened to the 
native population if immigration had remained at pre-1970  levels;  that 
is,  the  growth  path that would  have  been  observed  if  the  immigrant 
supply shock had never occurred. 
35.  The double  difference  regression  in equation  8 imposes  two restrictions  on the 
coefficients.  In particular, the coefficient  on the 1960-70  native growth rate is unity and 
the coefficient  of  the  1960-70  immigrant growth rate is equal,  but of opposite  sign,  to 
the coefficient  on the  1970-90  immigrant growth rate. The unrestricted regression  is 
L\n,(70, 90)  =  0.988  Z\n1(60,  70)  -  1.218 Am1(70, 90)  +  3.310  Z\mn1(60,  70), 
(0.167)  (0.333)  (0.925) 
where  the regression  includes  a constant  term and standard errors are in parentheses. 
The restriction on the native coefficient  is satisfied  by the data, whereas the restriction 
on the immigrant coefficients  is rejected (with a t statistic of 2.68). George  J.  Borjas,  Richard B.  Freeman,  and Lawrence  F.  Katz  33 
Table 10. Distribution  of Regional  Adult Populations  by Educational  Attainment, 
1950-90a 
Percent 
Years of schooling 
Region and year  Fewer than 9  9 to 11  12  13 to 15  16 or more 
California 
1950  26.8  20.5  31.8  13.2  7.7 
1960  20.9  21.8  32.6  15.0  9.7 
1970  12.5  17.8  36.6  19.9  13.2 
1980  9.6  13.2  34.2  24.8  18.3 
1990  9.3  13.4  22.0  33.0  22.3 
Other immigrant states" 
1950  39.8  20.6  25.1  7.8  6.7 
1960  30.5  22.8  28.3  9.9  8.4 
1970  19.1  21.2  35.1  12.9  11.6 
1980  11.0  16.1  37.7  18.4  16.8 
1990  6.6  14.2  29.2  28.1  21.8 
Other states 
1950  42.6  20.0  24.0  7.9  5.4 
1960  32.6  21.4  29.6  9.2  7.2 
1970  19.7  20.8  37.2  12.1  10.2 
1980  10.5  16.4  40.8  17.3  15.0 
1990  5.0  14.3  33.3  28.0  19.4 
United States 
1950  40.7  20.2  24.9  8.2  5.9 
1960  31.0  21.8  29.5  9.9  7.7 
1970  18.8  20.6  36.6  13.1  10.9 
1980  10.5  16.0  39.2  18.4  15.9 
1990  6.0  14.2  30.8  28.6  20.4 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the census PUMS (various years). 
a. Sample includes individuals aged eighteen to sixty-four and not living in group quarters. 
b. New York. New Jersey. Illinois,  Florida. and Texas. 
Does  Immigration Change Factor  Proportions  within a State? 
The migration response of natives would completely  diffuse  the ad- 
verse effect  of the immigrant supply shock on local labor markets if the 
native flows  of  particular skill  groups counterbalanced  the immigrant 
shock and left the relative factor proportions within a state unchanged. 
We now investigate  whether this was,  in fact,  the case. 
We begin  by classifying  workers according  to the five educational 
groups defined above.  Table  10 reports the trends in the factor shares 
of these skill groups in each of our three areas and in the United States 34  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1997 
as a whole.  It therefore summarizes what happens to the relative supply 
of the skill groups in these regions as a result of both immigration and 
the internal migration flows of natives.  There has been substantial con- 
vergence  in  the  regional  distribution  of  skills  over  1950-90.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  period,  California  had relatively  few  persons  who 
lacked  a high  school  diploma;  in  1950,  47.3  percent of  California's 
adult population had less than twelve  years of schooling,  as compared 
with 62.6  percent in the states without a strong immigrant presence.  By 
1990,  22.7  percent of  California's  population was  in this educational 
group,  as  compared  with  19.3  percent  for  the  nonimmigrant  states. 
California's  share of  less  educated workers declined  less  rapidly than 
shares in the rest of the nation,  both before and after the immigration 
shock.  From being  much  more  educated  than the  rest  of  the  nation 
before  1970,  the  population  of  California  has  changed  to  a bimodal 
distribution,  with a modestly  larger share of both those with less  than 
a high school  degree and those with at least a college  degree.  Table  10 
raises the question  of whether the educational  distribution of the pop- 
ulations of immigrant-receiving  states moved  closer  to that of the rest 
of the country because  of  increased unskilled  immigration or because 
of preexisting  forces leading toward convergence  in educational distri- 
butions across regions. 
We formalize  the analysis by estimating regression models designed 
to measure how the factor proportion of the various skill groups changed 
within a state over the period 1950-90.  We define the change in factor 
proportions for skill group k in state j as 
(9)  A~~~~/pj,k(t,  t'  =  Likt'  Likt 
where LUk,  gives the number of persons in state j belonging  to skill group 
k at time t, and LU,  gives  the total number of persons living  in the state. 
We define the immigrant contribution to the change  in factor propor- 
tions over the period as 
Al/kt,  M  MktJ  (10)  Aiinjk(t, t')  =  U_  , 
Consider the regression  model 
(1 1)  L\Pik(70,  90)  =  c  +  d lAn\jk(70, 90)  +  Vj +  Tk  +  ejk, George  J.  Borjas,  Richard B.  Freeman,  and Lawrence  F.  Katz  35 
where  v; is  a fixed effect  indicating  the state of  residence  and Tk is  a 
fixed effect  indicating educational  attainment. The empirical evidence 
presented in the previous  section  indicates  that the growth rate of  the 
total population in the state is essentially  unrelated to immigration. This 
implies  that one  can  treat the  variable  lAn-jJ(70,  90)  as  exogenous, 
despite the fact that the right-hand side includes a measure of Li 90. The 
state fixed effect  helps  to define the immigrant supply shock in terms 
of within-state deviations,  so that the coefficient  d measures how factor 
proportions change within a state when a particular skill group experi- 
ences  a supply shock.36 The coefficient  d has the interpretation 
L,k90-  YlLj, ,70  (12)  d  YM,,k.7o 
MjAk,9o  -  NMj,k,70 
where  y equals Lj,9o/Lj,70,  the state's  population  growth between  1970 
and  1990.37  If the state's  population  had not changed over the period 
(y equal to one),  the coefficient  d would simply measure the change in 
the  size  of  the population  associated  with  the entry of  an additional 
immigrant in that educational  group (ALjk/lAMjk).  If there were no mi- 
gration response  in the native population,  the coefficient  d would then 
be one,  while  if native migration completely  offset  the immigrant sup- 
ply shock,  the coefficient  would be zero.  In fact, the state's population 
did increase  over the period,  for reasons independent of immigration. 
Consequently  the coefficient  d measures  the  impact of  an additional 
immigrant on the total population  relative  to what would be expected 
if  all  groups  had experienced  neutral growth  (at the rate y)  over  the 
period  1970-90. 
Table 11 reports the estimated coefficient d for a variety of regression 
specifications.  The first row estimates  the first difference  model given 
by  equation  11.  The  coefficient  reported in the  first column  of  data 
36.  If there were  only  two  skill  groups  in the population,  u and s,  the fixed effect 
model of equation  11 would  be numerically  equivalent  to the regression 
Api,,(70,  90)  -  Apl,(70, 90)  =  (T,,  -  T)  +  d [Arj,,(70,  90) 
-  rmnj,(70,  90)]  +  (e-,,-eij) 
so  that the regression  would  simply  estimate  how  the difference  in immigrant supply 
shocks between  the two groups affects  the factor proportions within the state. 
37.  In particular,  note  that Ap,k(t,  t')  =  (Lij,.  -  YLj/k,)/Lj,  and that LAmr,k(t, t')  = 
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suggests  that d is strongly positive.  An additional immigrant in a given 
skill  group raises  the  total  number of  persons  in that skill  group by 
2.8.38 But we have argued that a more useful counterfactual exercise  is 
to compare the growth rate of a particular skill group before and after 
the immigrant supply  shock.  This  suggests  the alternative double dif- 
ference  regression  specification 
(13)  lVPik(70,  90)  -  Pi\k(50,  70) 
-  a  +  6 [liSkjk(70,  90)  -  ljhk(50,  70)] +  v; +  vk  +  elk. 
The  second  row of  table  11 shows  that the estimated  8  is 0.72.  This 
implies,  at most,  a moderate native response  to immigration within  a 
skill  group,  indicating  that immigration  does  alter factor proportions 
within a state. 
Our discussion  of the raw data describing  trends in the differences 
of skill distributions between geographic regions,  as shown in table 10, 
suggests  that the regression  models  of  equations  11 and  13 ignore  a 
factor that played a key role over the period 1950-90:  the convergence 
of skill distributions across states. This process was in operation before 
the immigrant supply shock began. To control for the convergence,  we 
add to the regression  model a variable giving  the fraction of the state's 
adult population  that belonged  to educational  group k in  1950: L  Ak  50/ 
Li,50.  The  resulting  coefficients  from  the  expanded  specification  are 
reported  in  the  second  column  of  table  119.3  The  inclusion  of  this 
"initial  conditions"  variable does  not affect  the estimated  migration 
effect  in  the  single  difference  model,  but does  reduce  the impact  of 
immigration  on  the total  supply  of  workers in a given  skill  group to 
zero in the double difference  model.  In other words, when one controls 
for the state's  preexisting  conditions  (both in terms of the initial  skill 
distribution and the rate at which this distribution was changing before 
1970),  the evidence  suggests  that immigration does not alter the factor 
proportions of skill groups within a state. 
38.  Card  (1997) also reports  a positive  correlation  between  the number  of immigrants 
in a particular  skill group  who entered  a local labor  market  and the number  of similarly 
skilled natives who chose to reside in that labor  market  in the period 1985-90. 
39.  The coefficient of the 1950 factor proportion  has a strong  negative effect in all 
the models estimated  in this section, suggesting  the importance  of convergence  in edu- 
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The last two rows of table  11 report the regression results when we 
redefine  skill  groups  by  aggregating  to  the two  groups  whose  factor 
proportions are most sensitive  to immigration: workers with less than a 
high school education and workers with at least a high school education. 
The single  difference  models  consistently  yield  a strong positive  cor- 
relation between  immigration and changes  in factor proportions within 
these aggregated skill groups, but this positive  effect vanishes when we 
control for the pre- 1970 growth rates of the skill groups in the state and 
for the convergence  process. 
Finally,  we  convert  the population  counts  into efficiency  units  by 
weighting  each person by the relative wage of a person who has similar 
observed  characteristics  (that is,  sex,  age,  education,  and nationality) 
in the base  period  1980.40 Calculating  supply  shifts  in terms of  effi- 
ciency  units yields  a better measure of changes  in the supplies of par- 
ticular skill  groups than the simple population counts used throughout 
our  analysis.  We  use  these  efficiency  unit  counts  to  reestimate  the 
various  specifications;  the last two columns  of table  11 show that our 
regression  results are not affected. 
In sum, the answer to whether immigration affects factor proportions 
within a state appears to depend on how one specifies the counterfactual 
of what would have happened absent immigration.  Under our preferred 
specification-which  controls  for the initial  level  and past change  in 
state skill distributions-the  evidence  shows  that much of the adverse 
impact  of  immigration  on  the  economic  opportunities  of  workers  in 
areas directly  affected  by  the  immigrant  supply  shock  was  diffused 
across the country, as native migration flows responded to local influxes 
of immigrants.4' 
40.  We divide the labor  force aged eighteen to sixty-four into 280 distinct groups 
based on sex-age-education-nationality  cells (2 sex groups x  5 age groups x  4 edu- 
cation groups x  7 nationality  groups =  280 cells). The age groups are eighteen to 
twenty-four,  twenty-five  to thirty-four,  thirty-five  to forty-four,  forty-five  to fifty-four, 
and  fifty-five  to sixty-four;  the educational  groups  are fewer than  twelve years  of school- 
ing, twelve years, thirteen  to fifteen years, and sixteen plus years; and the nationality 
groups  are black U.S. natives, nonblack  U.S. natives, Mexican  immigrants,  other  Latin 
American  immigrants,  European  immigrants,  Asian immigrants,  and other  immigrants. 
We then calculate  the average  hourly  wage for full-time workers  in each cell using the 
1980  census PUMS and weight individuals  by the estimated  average  wage for their  sex- 
age-education-nationality  cell in 1980. 
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The Aggregate Factor Proportions Approach 
Trade theorists have long recognized  that trade and immigration (and 
international capital flows) are potentially  substitute ways for a country 
to make use of factors that are scarce within its borders.42  Nevertheless, 
empirical  studies  of  trade and immigration  have  proceeded  indepen- 
dently.  To the extent  that trade and immigration  are substitute means 
of altering effective  national factor proportions, it is incorrect to analyze 
them separately.  Examining how changes  in trade affect U.S.  workers 
without recognizing  that in the absence of trade there will be increased 
economic  incentives  for  greater  immigration  (or  capital  flows)  will 
likely overstate the effects  of trade. Examining how immigration affects 
U.S.  workers without  recognizing  that reduced levels  of  immigration 
will  create  incentives  for greater trade (and capital  flows)  will  likely 
overstate the economic  effects  of immigration. 
In earlier work,  we tried to remedy this problem by analyzing  how 
trade and immigration together alter the nation's endowments  of labor 
skills.43 The basic idea of our aggregate factor proportions approach is 
to compare the nation's  actual supplies  of  skilled  and unskilled  labor 
to those  it would  have had at different levels  of immigration or trade; 
and then to assess the relative wage consequences  of these immigration- 
or trade-induced changes  in factor supplies,  where the effective  factor 
endowment  of  a given  skill  group is the sum of the number of  native 
workers,  the number of immigrants,  and the number of workers "em- 
wages or employment  on an occupational  basis. Complaints  by groups  of mathematicians 
and software  engineers about immigrant  competition  and the American  Medical Asso- 
ciation's proposal  to restrict  foreign supply  of medical  personnel  show that  native  work- 
ers in these areas  perceive considerable  competition  from foreign-born  workers.  There 
is, however, a major problem in using occupations  as a unit of observation  over the 
period covered by the immigration  shock: the Census Bureau implemented  a major 
reclassification  of occupations  between  the 1970 and 1980 censuses (U.S. Bureau  of the 
Census, 1989). Our  own exploratory  work relating  occupational  earnings  to immigrant 
intensities suggests that empirical results are sensitive to the concordance  among the 
occupations  over the period. In our view, an occupations-based  approach  merits  further 
study as an alternative  to the spatial correlations  approach,  bearing  in mind this basic 
problem.  For an insightful  study using occupations  as the unit  of analysis, see Friedberg 
(1996), who uses data  on the occupational  distribution  of recent  Russian  immigrants  to 
Israel  before and after  immigration  to examine  effects of immigration  on Israeli  natives. 
42.  See Mundell  (1957) for this view of trade  and immigration. 
43.  Borjas, Freeman,  and Katz (1992, 1996). 40  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
bodied"  in net imports.  We estimate  the latter using fixed coefficient 
factor content calculations. 
In its simplest form, our analysis uses a constant elasticity  of substi- 
tution  (CES)  aggregate  production  function  with  two  inputs:  skilled 
labor (s) and unskilled  labor (u).  We postulate that relative  wages  are 
determined by the intersection of an inelastic (predetermined) short-run 
relative  labor supply  function  and a downward-sloping  relative  labor 
demand  function  derived  from  the  CES.  In this  framework,  skilled 
wages  relative to unskilled  wages  in year t, w,lw1,,, will depend on the 
relative  labor supplies  in year t, xs,/x1,, and the level  of relative  labor 
demand,  so that 
(14)  ln  st =_  (D, -  ln  - 
wlit  cr  xlit 
where u is the aggregate elasticity  of substitution between  skilled  and 
unskilled  workers and D, indexes  log relative demand shifts for skilled 
workers.44 The impact of  a given  change  in relative  skill  supplies  de- 
pends inversely  on the magnitude of u. 
As noted, the national (implicit)  supply of skill group k at time t has 
three components:  native workers (Nk,),  immigrant workers (M*,), and 
the effective  supply of  workers of type k contained  in net trade flows 
(Tt,): 
(15)  Xk,  =  Nkt  +  Mk,  +  Tk,  =  Nkt  (  +  MNt $Tk). 
The log relative  supply of skilled workers is affected by the skill com- 
position  of the native work force  and the relative contributions of im- 
migration and trade to the supplies of skilled  and unskilled  workers: 
(16)  In xst =  In N,,  +  In  I  +  M,  +  Tst  ln  I  +  Milt +  T,,, 
Xit  N1,  N',/  N1, 
44.  The aggregate  elasticity  of substitution  (a) reflects  not only technical  substitution 
possibilities in production  at the firm  or industry  level, but also consumer  substitution 
possibilities across goods and services. The appropriate  value of a- for assessing how 
aggregate  changes in relative  skill supplies affect relative  wages is likely to be substan- 
tially larger than the elasticity of substitution  in production  of skilled and unskilled 
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We  assume  that the  stock  of  immigrants  at time  t is  predetermined 
relative to trade flows.  Thus the separate contributions of immigration 
and trade to the log  relative  supply  of  skilled  workers,  ln(xs,/x1,,),  are 
given  by 
(17)  immigration contribution =  In  I  +  -  n  + 
and 
(18)  trade contribution =  In  I  +  L)  -  In  +  L.,,) 
where Lk, =  Nk,  +  M*,  is the direct labor supply of group k (both native- 
and foreign-born). 
To use equations  14,  17, and 18 to assess how immigration and trade 
affect the wages  of more skilled natives relative to those of less  skilled 
natives,  we need the following  information: the change in the number 
of immigrants relative to natives  with different levels  of skill; the im- 
plicit change in skill supplies embodied in trade; and an estimate of the 
responsiveness  of  relative  wages  to relative  skill  supplies  (1/U).  We 
also  need  to aggregate  heterogeneous  workers into our aggregates  of 
skilled  and of  unskilled  labor.  Since  the aggregate  factor proportions 
approach simulates what might have happened to the labor market under 
different immigration and trade scenarios,  we must also carefully spec- 
ify the counterfactual under consideration. 
When Are Factor  Contents  Useful? 
Under what  conditions  will  this  framework provide  useful  insight 
into the effects  of immigration and trade on the labor market? The first 
condition  is  that changes  in national relative  skill  supplies  affect  na- 
tional relative wages.  If the world economy  were sufficiently  integrated 
to create factor price equalization  among countries,  then relative labor 
supply  conditions  in  the  world  would  enter  the  wage  determination 
equation.45 Neither  national  demand  nor  national  supply  conditions 
45.  For this argument in relation to the world economy,  see Leamer (1996a);  and in 
relation to  the  Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and Development,  see  Davis 
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would affect relative wages,  except to the extent they changed relative 
demand and supply  within  the  world  economy.  But  a large  body  of 
empirical evidence  shows  that national economic  conditions  do affect 
relative wages  by skill  and education.  Many time-series  studies of the 
United States  find that increases  in the (detrended) relative  supply  of 
more educated workers are negatively  related to changes in the relative 
wages  of  more  educated  workers.46 Similar  correlations  have  been 
found for many other countries,  including  Britain, Canada, South Ko- 
rea,  and  Sweden.47  Canada  and  the  United  States  have  sufficiently 
separate labor markets that differences  in the rates of  growth  of  the 
relative supply of college-educated  workers from the 1970s to the 1  980s 
help to explain the much larger growth in the college-high  school wage 
differential  in the United  States  during the  1980s.48 More  generally, 
research indicates that levels  and changes in relative pay by skill across 
countries depend substantially on national wage-setting  institutions and 
relative  skill  supplies.49 
The second condition is that one can define skill categories  to distin- 
guish  which  groups of immigrants and natives  are substitutes or com- 
plements.  The standard assumption is that persons with the same num- 
ber of years of schooling  are perfect substitutes and those with different 
levels  of schooling  are imperfect substitutes (possibly,  complements). 
But  immigrants  earn less  than  natives  with  the  same  schooling,  so 
perhaps they should be viewed  as substitutes for natives with modestly 
lower education.  A sizable  number of immigrants have less  than nine 
years  of  schooling,  which  could  make  them  complements  even  for 
native high school dropouts with nine to eleven  years of schooling.  And 
some immigrants work in specialized  areas where they may complement 
natives with similar skills-for  example,  as language teachers or own- 
ers of specialty  restaurants. 
Determining which groups of immigrants compete with which groups 
of natives is not a trivial issue.  If one uses years of schooling  to define 
skill categories,  one obtains different pictures of immigrant effects  on 
factor proportions depending  on where  one  cuts the schooling  distri- 
46.  Freeman (1975);  Katz and Murphy (1992);  Murphy and Welch  (1992). 
47.  On  these  countries  respectively,  see  Schmitt  (1995),  Freeman  and  Needels 
(1993),  Kim and Topel  (1995),  and Edin and Holmlund (1995). 
48.  Freeman and Needels  (1993). 
49.  See,  for example,  Blau and Kahn (1996)  and Freeman and Katz (1994). George J. Borjas, Richard  B. Freeman, and Lawrence  F. Katz  43 
bution. We deal with this problem by specifying competing native 
groups based both on alternative educational groupings and on the 
position of immigrants  in the native earnings  distribution. 
The third condition is that the estimate of the effect of trade on 
national skill proportions  captures  the full impact of trade on wages. 
This is a contentious and difficult issue, on which trade economists 
have divergent views.  Some believe that factor content analyses are 
essentially meaningless;  others regard  them as a valid measure  of po- 
tential  trade  effects on the labor  market  for modest  trade  shocks relative 
to a well-defined  baseline scenario. Some argue  that  all the information 
needed to assess the effects of trade  on the labor  market  is contained  in 
the prices of traded  goods, which have magnified  effects on wages, and 
that actual trade flows are irrelevant. Little did we realize when we 
wrote our 1992 paper  using factor content  analysis that  the field would 
become such a battle zone.50 
There are circumstances  under which factor content analyses are 
justifiable  in standard  trade  models. If one begins with autarky  and  then 
allows for trade, and trade  is a modest proportion  of the national  econ- 
omy, the change in national  factor  endowments  due to the factor  content 
of trade  measures  the pressure  of trade  for changes in relative wages.5' 
In this scenario, as in our model, the fall of trade  barriers  creates  a flow 
of tradables  whose factor  content  times the reciprocal  of the appropriate 
elasticity of substitution  produces  the implied effect of the opening of 
trade  on relative wages. 
But there are also circumstances  under which the flows of traded 
goods may bear  little or no relation  to the pressure  from  trade  on wages. 
As an extreme case, suppose that an LDC firm  begins producing  sou- 
venirs of the Empire  State building and informs souvenir  stands  that it 
can provide  products  at lower prices than  U.S. producers.  The souvenir 
stands  will then inform  American  manufacturers  that  they have to meet 
the new price to keep their business. The U.S.  firms, in turn, will tell 
their  workers  that  the firms  can stay in business only if the workers  take 
a pay cut. If the workers  accept the cut, the U.S.  firms will maintain 
50.  On the problems  with factor  content  analyses, see Leamer  (1  996b) and  Deardorff 
and Hakura  (1994); on their validity, see Deardorff and Staiger (1988),  Krugman 
(1995b), Sachs and Shatz (1994), and Wood (1994,  1995); and on the irrelevance  of 
actual  trade  flows, see Bhagwati  and Dehejia (1994). 
51.  Deardorff  and Staiger  (1988); Krugman  (1995b). 44  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
their hold on the souvenir market, with no new trade flows. But the 
threat of trade (like the threat of entry in a contestable market)  will 
have reduced wages in the United States. In this example, the only 
"footprint" of trade is the change in the relative price of souvenirs. 
This is, in stark  form, the argument  that trade  flows do not accurately 
reflect trade  pressures  on the labor market. 
This model is difficult to assess empirically, and there have been 
only limited efforts to do So.52  The analyst must show, first, that the 
domestic relative  price of goods produced  by the less skilled has fallen; 
and second, that this price change is due to the "unobservable" threat 
of trade rather than some other factor (for example, differences in 
sectoral rates of technological change or, as in the 1980s, a fall in the 
real value of the minimum  wage). If foreign goods are imperfect  sub- 
stitutes  for U.S.-made goods in the same sector, the analyst  muist  assess 
the degree of substitutability.  In a world in which product  and labor 
demand  curves in traded  goods are not perfectly elastic at the "going 
world price" and in which native workers in the traded  goods sector 
may earn some economic rents, trade  may also alter  the wage structure 
by making demand curves more elastic and squeezing those rents.53 
Moreover, the model implies that labor skill ratios fall within sectors, 
as firms  substitute  toward  the low-skill workers  displaced  from import- 
competing industries-which  is contrary  to the observed rise in those 
ratios.54  While the price-side model may be hard  to estimate, it does 
suggest that factor content analyses that infer the effect of trade on 
implicit national factor endowments from observed trade flows are 
likely to understate  the impact  of trade  on relative wages. 
There is yet another  area of controversy  in factor content analysis. 
The standard  analysis estimates the labor supply embodied in traded 
goods using current  average unit labor coefficients for different skill 
categories from import-competing  and export-producing  sectors in the 
52.  See, for example, Sachs and Shatz (1994), Krueger  (1997), and Baldwin and 
Cain (1997). 
53.  On the elasticity  of demand  curves, see Rodrik  (1997); on the squeezing  of rents, 
see Borjas  and Ramey (1995). 
54.  See Lawrence  and  Slaughter  (1993), Berman,  Bound, and  Griliches  (1994), and 
Autor, Katz, and Krueger  (1997). 
55.  Baldwin  and Cain (1997) provide  a useful examination  of the evidence on price 
effects and find similar modest impacts  of trade  on U.S. relative wages using both the 
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home economy.56 But Adrian Wood argues that one should not use unit 
labor coefficients  from current advanced country production relations 
when  assessing  the factor content  of  imports from LDCs to advanced 
industrial nations.57 One reason  is that within  every  sector there is  a 
wide  distribution  of  labor input coefficients,  reflecting  differences  in 
skill  intensities  of employment,  differences  in labor productivity,  and 
differentiated products. If LDC trade has driven out the most unskilled 
labor-intensive  modes of production from an import-competing  indus- 
try, current average  labor input coefficients  will  understate the effect 
of LDC trade in augmenting the effective  supply of less skilled workers 
in advanced nations.  The appropriate labor input coefficients  are those 
for the marginal technologies  and products that would expand in import- 
competing  sectors  absent this trade. Wood  also  argues that firms may 
alter  their  technologies  or  input  coefficients  in  response  to  trade 
pressures. 
We are sympathetic  to Wood's  argument.  As he emphasizes,  there 
is  substantial  heterogeneity  in  the  relative  utilization  of  less  skilled 
workers (that is,  high school dropouts) across plants. Tabulations from 
the  Worker-Establishment  Characteristic  Database  (WECD),  an 
employer-employee  matched database for U.S.  manufacturing in 1990 
compiled  by the U.S.  Bureau of  the Census,  show  substantial differ- 
ences  in the educational  composition  of the work force within detailed 
manufacturing industries.58 Within the typical three-digit industry, the 
employment  share of  high  school  dropouts  in  the bottom  quarter of 
plants,  ranked by average worker education,  is 2.4  times the industry 
average (0.40  versus 0. 17).59 Mark Doms,  Timothy Dunne,  and Ken- 
neth Troske  find that establishments  with  less  educated  workers  are 
much less  likely  to use new technologies  than those with more skilled 
workers in the same industry. J. Bradford Jensen and Troske find that 
in most four-digit  manufacturing industries in 1992,  the ninetieth per- 
centile  plant (ranked by labor productivity)  had labor productivity that 
was over three times that of the tenth percentile plant.60  If LDC imports 
56.  See, for example, Sachs and Shatz (1994). 
57.  Wood (1994, 1995). 
58.  We are grateful  to Kenneth  Troske for these tabulations.  The WECD is docu- 
mented  and described  in Troske (1995) and Doms, Dunne, and Troske  (1997). 
59. The bottom quarter  of plants, in terms of average worker  education, employ 
15 percent  of all workers  in the typical industry. 
60.  Doms, Dunne, and Troske  (1997); Jensen  and Troske  (1997). 46  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
affect  the less  skilled  and lower  productivity  segment  of  a three-digit 
industry, then the actual increment to the implicit supply of low-skilled 
workers from such trade flows  could easily  be three times  larger than 
the estimates  based on current average industry skill  shares and labor 
productivity  levels. 
To address this issue,  Wood takes input coefficients  from LDCs and 
adjusts them for relative wages  in the United States or western Europe 
to  approximate  marginal  input coefficients  and assumes  that,  absent 
trade,  technologies  would  not  improve  in  the  traded goods  sector. 
Elsewhere,  we  use  input coefficients  averaged  over  an earlier period 
(1967-87),  but do not examine  the sensitivity  of results to alternative 
assumptions.6' In the present study, we use U.S.  input coefficients  (skill 
shares) from past years (1970,  1980,  1990)  and carefully  specify  our 
assumptions  about the technology  for producing import-competing  and 
other goods  and product demand responses. 
The Facts  to Be Explained 
It is well documented that educational wage differentials  and overall 
wage  inequality  have greatly  increased  in the United  States  since  the 
late 1970s.  Most estimates of changes in educational wage differentials 
are based on samples  containing  both U.S.  natives  and immigrants.62 
Since  recent immigrants typically  earn less  than U.S.  natives with the 
same  level  of  education,  the disproportionately  growing  share of  im- 
migrants among less educated workers in the United States means that 
the usual estimates  may overstate changes  in relative wages  by educa- 
tion for U.S.  natives.  To assess  the contributions of immigration-  and 
trade-induced changes  in relative  labor supplies  on the relative  wages 
of U.S.  natives requires estimates  of changes  in educational wage dif- 
ferentials  for U.S.  natives alone. 
Table  12 presents estimates  for three measures of educational  wage 
differentials  for natives between  1960 and 1995.  The differentials  are 
derived  from cross-section  regressions  of  log  hourly earnings on five 
education  dummies  (zero  to eight  years of  schooling,  nine to eleven 
years, thirteen to fifteen years, sixteen years, and seventeen plus years, 
61.  Borjas, Freeman,  and Katz (1992). 
62.  See, for example, Bound  and  Johnson  (1992) and  Mishel, Bernstein,  and  Schmitt 
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Table 12. Native Log Wage  Differentials,  by Educational  Attainment, 1960-95a 
Log point  difference 
College graduate  College or more  High school or more 
relative to  relative to  relative to 
Year  high school graduateb  high school graduatec  high school dropoutd 
1960  0.319  0.317  0.280 
1970  0.362  0.374  0.312 
1980  0.279  0.304  0.301 
1990  0.412  0.458  0.374 
1995  0.420  0.495  0.410 
Source: Authors' calculations.  Wage data for 1960-90  actually refer to  1959,  1969,  1979. and 1989 and are from the 
census PUMS. Wages for 1995 are extrapolated from the 1990 census PUMS, using observed changes between the February 
1990 CPS and the 1995 CPS. MORG file. 
a. Wages are hourly earnings of fu]]-time native wage and sa]ary workers aged eighteen to sixty-four, adjusted for age, 
sex,  race, and r-egion, as described in the text. 
b. Log wage of natives with exactly sixteen years of schooling less that of natives with exactly twelve years. 
c.  Log wage of natives with sixteen or more years of schooling less that of natives with exactly twelve years. 
d. Log wage of natives with twelve or more years of schooling less that of natives with fewer than twelve years. 
with twelve  years as the base group), a quartic in age, a female dummy, 
a nonwhite dummy,  and three region dummies.  Our samples comprise 
native  full-time  workers  aged  eighteen  to  sixty-four,  from the  1960, 
1970,  1980,  and 1990 census  PUMSs  and the Merged Outgoing Rota- 
tion Group (MORG) file of the  1995 Current Population Survey (CPS) 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The first column of table  12 dis- 
plays the log wage  gap between  workers with exactly  sixteen  years of 
schooling  (college  graduates) and those  with  exactly  twelve  years of 
schooling  (high  school  graduates).  The  second  column  expands  the 
college  group to include those  with advanced degrees.  Both measures 
of  the college-high  school  wage  differential  expand  modestly  in the 
1960s,  contract in the  1970s,  and increase  substantially  in the  1980s. 
The growth rate in the college-high  school wage gap slows  down from 
1990 to  1995,  but the increase  over this period remains sizable  when 
those  with  advanced  degrees  are included  in the college  group.  The 
time pattern of changes in the college-high  school wage gap for natives 
is  quite  similar  to  estimates  for  the  overall  U.S.  work  force,  using 
samples that include both immigrants and natives.63 
The last column of table 12 examines  the wage of native high school 
dropouts relative to that of natives with at least twelve  years of school- 
ing.  High  school  dropouts  are the group most  likely  to be  adversely 
63.  See, for example, Autor, Katz, and Krueger  (1997). 48  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1997 
affected by the recent growth of less skilled immigration and trade with 
LDCs.  The relative  earnings  of  native  high  school  dropouts declined 
by 0.073  log point from  1980 to  1990 and continued  to decline  at the 
same rate in the early  1990s. 
Note  that  there  has  been  a  decline  in  the  relative  wages  of  less 
educated workers since  1980,  even though the relative supply (of both 
natives and immigrants) has continued to decline.  Table  13 documents 
changes  in the educational composition  of direct U.S.  labor input (na- 
tives plus immigrants), measured in full-time equivalents (or total hours 
worked),  from 1960 to 1995.64  Although the share of high school drop- 
outs has declined  consistently  and the share of college  equivalents  has 
grown throughout the past thirty-five  years,  the rate of  growth of  the 
relative  supply of more educated workers accelerated in the 1970s and 
decelerated  in the  1980s.  The slower  growth of the relative  supply of 
skills  may  help  to  explain  the  quite  different  outcomes  for  relative 
wages  by education in the 1970s and in the 1980s and 1990s illustrated 
in table  12. 
To  examine  the  impact  of  the  supply  shifts  induced  by  trade and 
immigration on native relative wages,  we aggregate workers into skill 
groups  in  two  ways.  First,  following  David  Autor,  Katz,  and Alan 
Krueger and also  George  Johnson,  we  aggregate  the labor force  into 
high  school  equivalents  (all  workers  with  twelve  or  fewer  years  of 
schooling  and one-half  of those with some college  education)  and col- 
lege equivalents  (all workers with at least a college  degree and one-half 
of those with some college  education).65 Katz and Kevin Murphy show 
64.  Changes introduced  in the 1990 census to the educational  attainment  question 
make it difficult to assess accurately  changes in relative education supplies over the 
1980s using the public use samples  of the 1980 and 1990 censuses. The CPS continued 
to use the old question ("highest grade  attended  and completed") through  1991. Thus 
the 1980 and 1990 CPS, MORG  files have consistent  education  coding and  can be used 
to measure  changes in relative supplies by educational  group. The February  1990 CPS 
asked individuals  about  educational  attainment  with both  the new and  the old questions. 
We estimate changes from 1990 to 1995 using the February  1990 CPS and the 1995 
CPS, MORG  file. Changes  from 1990 to 1995 should  be interpreted  with some caution, 
because the complete overhaul  of the CPS in 1994, with the shift to computer-assisted 
interviewing,  implies the possibility of unknown  differences  in responses  to education 
questions. We use the coding scheme suggested by Jaeger  (1997) for the new census 
and CPS education  codes, classifying workers  indicating  twelve years of schooling but 
no degree as high school graduates.  The data appendix  of Autor, Katz, and Krueger 
(1997) provides  additional  information  on these issues of data  comparability. 
65.  Autor, Katz, and Krueger  (1997); Johnson  (1997a). I  -2.  -  -  '  : 
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that detrended changes  in the supplies  of similar aggregates of college 
equivalents  relative  to high school  equivalents  do a reasonable job  of 
explaining  changes in a broad measure of the college-high  school wage 
differentials  such as that presented in the second column of table  12.66 
They  estimate  a version  of  equation  14 and find the elasticity  of  the 
relative  wage of college  graduates to changes  in the relative supply of 
college  equivalents  is approximately  -  0.709  (implying  an economy- 
wide estimate  of the elasticity  of substitution between  college  equiva- 
lents  and  high  school  equivalents,  u,  of  1.41).  Thus  we  calculate 
immigration- and trade-induced changes in the relative supplies of col- 
lege and high school equivalents and examine the implied relative wage 
effects  using the Katz-Murphy estimate of the wage elasticity. 
Second,  we divide  the labor force into high school  dropouts and all 
other workers and use an estimated wage elasticity  for the response of 
the relative wage of dropouts to their relative supply of  -  0.322,  from 
time-series  estimates  covering  the period 1963-87  that we report in an 
earlier study.67 
We  address  compositional  changes  within  our  broad  educational 
groups by adjusting the changes  in hours by skill group into efficiency 
units,  by weighting  each individual's  hours by the average wage of an 
individual with similar observed characteristics (that is,  sex,  age,  edu- 
cation,  and nationality)  in a base period (1980).68 
The Effect of Immigration on Relative Labor Supplies 
Table  14 shows  our estimates  of the contribution of immigration to 
labor supply in efficiency  units by broad educational groups from 1960 
to  1995.  The  first two  columns  display  the  immigrant-to-native  effi- 
66.  Katz and Murphy  (1992). 
67.  Borjas, Freeman,  and Katz (1992). 
68.  Katz  and  Murphy  (1992) provide  a justification  for this efficiency units approach 
to aggregation  in measuring  how relative  supply  and  demand  shifts affect relative  wages 
by skill group. In the present  study, we divide the labor force aged eighteen to sixty- 
four into 280 distinct  groups  based  on sex-age-education-nationality  cells (2 sex groups 
x  5 age groups x 4 education  groups x  7 nationality  groups = 280 cells). We calculate 
the average  hourly wage for full-time workers  in each cell using the 1 percent  random 
sample from the 1980 census PUMS for natives and 5 percent  random  sample from the 
1980 census PUMS for immigrants.  Thus we weight each individual's  annual  hours  of 
work  by the estimated  average  wage for their  sex-age-education-nationality  cell in 1980. 
See note 40 for more details on the definition  of the groups. 0000-  -~~~~~~~0 
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ciency  unit ratios (MIN) for high school dropouts and those with at least 
twelve  years  of  schooling.  The  third column  follows  equation  17 in 
presenting  the immigration contribution to the log  supply of dropouts 
relative to more educated workers. The estimates for all immigrants in 
table  14 show the growing contribution of immigration to the supply of 
high school  dropouts, especially  since  1980; the ratio of immigrants to 
natives  among  dropouts  increased  from  0. 109  in  1980  to  0.383  in 
1995.69  These  changes  reflect  both the  rapid decline  of  the  share of 
native labor force participants who are dropouts and the increased im- 
migration  since  1980,  while  there  was  little  decline  in  the  share of 
immigrant workers who have less  than twelve  years of schooling. 
Some of the growth shown in table 14 in the immigrant contribution 
to the relative supply of dropouts since  1980 would have occurred even 
if immigration had been cut off in 1980.  This is because of differences 
in the age  structure of  less  educated  immigrants and natives  in  1980. 
To  determine  the  effect  on  the  labor  supply  by  education  of  those 
immigrants who entered after 1979,  in the last row of table 14 we treat 
all immigrants living  in the United States before  1980 as natives.  Post- 
1979 immigrants increased the relative  supply of dropouts in 1995 by 
0.149  log  point,  which  is 0.048  log  point smaller than the 0.197  log 
point increase from 1980 to 1995 shown in the upper panel of the table. 
With our preferred relative wage elasticity  for dropouts of  -  0.322, 
the estimates  in the first three columns  of table  14 imply that the im- 
migrant contribution  to the relative  supply  of  dropouts can explain  a 
change  in the wage  of dropouts relative  to that of nondropouts of be- 
69.  The Census  Bureau switched  its approach to adjusting sampling weights  by age, 
sex,  race or Hispanic  origin,  and state starting with the implementation  of the revised 
CPS survey in 1994. Barry Edmonston has pointed out to us, in personal communication, 
that demographers  have  raised concerns  that the official  sampling  weights  may under- 
weight  the Asian  and American  Indian populations  by 30 percent or more in the  1995 
CPS.  Since  Asians  are disproportionately  immigrants,  and more educated than the typ- 
ical  immigrant,  our tabulations  of  immigrant  employment  and efficiency  unit  shares 
from the  1995 CPS,  MORG file  may slightly  overestimate  the relative  contribution  of 
immigrants to less educated skill groups in comparison with more educated skill groups. 
We checked  the sensitivity  of all our findings from the  1995 CPS increasing the relative 
weights  of Asians  and American Indians in the sample by 30 percent. The effects  of this 
adjustment are modest  in every  case  and lead to no substantive  changes  in our conclu- 
sions.  For  example,  the  log  relative  supply  contribution  of  immigrants  to  dropouts 
declines  from 0.244  to 0.243  and the log  relative supply contribution of immigrants to 
high  school  equivalents  declines  from 0.015  to 0.012,  when  the  1995  CPS  sample  is 
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tween  -0.048  and  -0.063  log  point  from  1980  to  1995.  Thus  the 
factor proportions approach,  treating immigrant and native  efficiency 
units within the dropout and graduate skill categories  as perfect substi- 
tutes,  implies  that immigration-induced  changes  in labor supply  may 
account for 44 to 58 percent of the 0. 109 log point decline in the relative 
earnings of dropouts over this period. 
The  last  three  columns  of  table  14 reveal  only  modest  effects  of 
immigration on the supply of high school equivalents relative to college 
equivalents.  Since  the education  distribution  of  immigrants  is  bimo- 
dal-many  have  less  than twelve  years  of  schooling  and many have 
college  and advanced  degrees-the  effect  of  immigration  on relative 
skill  supplies  is greatly diminished  when one aggregates  workers into 
high  school  and college  equivalent  workers.  The estimate  for all  im- 
migrants  puts the immigration  impact  on the relative  supply  of  high 
school  equivalents  at 0.024  log point from 1980 to 1995.  The estimate 
for  post-1979  immigrants  indicates  that these  expanded  the  relative 
supply  of  high  school  equivalents  by 0.013  log  point in  1995.  Using 
our preferred relative  wage elasticity  of  -  0.709,  we estimate that the 
contribution of immigration to changes in the college-high  school wage 
differential  from  1980 to  1995 ranges from 0.009  to 0.017  log  point; 
or 5 to 9 percent of the actual 0.191  log point increase in the college- 
high school  wage differential  for U.S.  natives over this period. 
We conclude  that the immigrant-induced  increases  in relative labor 
supply  are  strongly  concentrated  on  U.S.  workers  with  fewer  than 
twelve  years of schooling  and that the slowdown  in the rate of decline 
of  the relative  supply  of  dropouts due to  unskilled  immigration  may 
explain  a sizable  fraction  of  the  decline  in the earnings  of  dropouts 
relative to those with twelve  or more years of schooling  over the period 
1980-95.  In contrast, the immigrant supply contribution for a broader 
group of  less  educated  workers  is  too  small  to  account  for even  10 
percent of the sharp growth in the college-high  school wage differential 
during this period. 
In our assessment  of the immigrant contribution to changes  in skill 
supplies,  we  classify  workers into skill  groups by years of  schooling. 
Under  this  approach,  the  impact  of  less  skilled  immigration  on  the 
relative  supply  of  less  educated  natives  is  magnified  by  the  rapidly 
declining  share of high school  dropouts in the native labor force.  But 
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group of  low-wage  natives  than native  high  school  dropouts.  As  an 
alternative way to measure immigrant-induced changes in labor market 
competition,  we classify  workers into skill groups based on their hourly 
wages rather than level of education.  We sort workers by wages in each 
year (1980,  1990,  and 1995) and define skill groups by percentile  cut- 
off points in the native wage  distribution.70 We focus  on two aggrega- 
tion  schemes:  (a) workers with wages  above  and below  the twentieth 
percentile  of the native wage  distribution (since  the share of dropouts 
in the labor force  in  1980,  when the large immigration  shock  began, 
was approximately 20 percent); and (b) workers with wages  above and 
below  the sixtieth  percentile  of  the native  wage  distribution (a group 
close  in size  to high school  equivalents  in 1980).  Immigrant contribu- 
tions  to the relative  supply of these  two groups are determined by the 
difference  in the ratio of  immigrants  to natives  above  and below  the 
cut-off point in the native wage distribution defining the low- and high- 
skill  aggregates.  Thus  we  compare  how  the  growth  of  immigration 
differentially  affects  fixed shares of low-  and high-wage  natives. 
Table  15 presents our estimates  of immigrant-induced  supply shifts 
by skill  groups defined by percentiles  of the native wage  distribution. 
It indicates  that immigrants are increasingly  concentrated in the lower 
parts of  the  native  wage  distribution.  For  all  immigrants,  the  table 
shows  that the  log  relative  supply  contribution  of  immigrants  to  the 
bottom 20 percent of natives relative to the upper 80 percent increased 
from 0.030  log point to 0.130  log  point between  1980 and 1995.  The 
lower  panel  shows  that immigrants who  arrived since  1980 expanded 
the relative  supply of the bottom 20 percent of native workers in  1995 
by  a similar  amount,  0.094  log  point.  Comparing  these  results  with 
those in table  14, we conclude  that the post-1979  immigration relative 
supply increment to less-skilled  labor is modestly lower when measured 
relative to a fixed share of low-wage  natives rather than relative to the 
declining  share of  high  school  dropouts.  The  contribution  of  recent 
immigrants to the relative  supply of workers earning wages  below  the 
sixtieth native percentile is actually somewhat larger than the immigrant 
70.  Specifically,  we  adjust wages  for differences  in sex,  age,  and region.  For each 
year,  we  run a regression  of  log  hourly  wages  of  U.S.  natives  on  a quartic in age,  a 
female dummy,  an interaction of age and the female dummy,  and three region dummies. 
We then sort both natives and immigrants by their adjusted log hourly wages  (actual log 
hourly wage  less  the predicted wage  from this native wage  regression). \st c.c  O  .  C 
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effect  on the relative supply of high school  equivalents,  since a dispro- 
portionate number of college-educated  immigrants earn relatively  low 
wages. 
Both the educational group and wage group approaches to measuring 
the effects  of  immigrants on relative  skill  supplies  may overstate  the 
effects  of  immigrant competition  on low-skill  natives.  If  immigrants 
and natives with similar education, or wages,  or both operate in partially 
segmented  labor markets, changes  in immigrant supply may have little 
impact on native wages.  The growing share of immigrants in the lower 
part of the native wage distribution may reflect declining  labor market 
conditions due to immigrant crowding into a segmented immigrant labor 
market, rather than increased  competition  for low-wage  natives.  It is 
difficult  to  assess  this  alternative  hypothesis  within  our framework. 
However,  David Jaeger presents some aggregate and metropolitan area- 
level,data  from the  1980 and 1990 censuses  indicating that changes  in 
the relative supply of immigrants to natives within sex-education  groups 
have little effect  on the immigrant-native wage gap for a given group. 
This evidence  suggests  that immigrants and natives may be nearly per- 
fect  substitutes  in production within broad educational  groups (as we 
assume  in our education-based  approach). 
The Effect of LDC Trade on Implicit Relative Labor Supplies 
We  next  examine  the extent  to which  increased  trade between  the 
United  States  and less  developed  countries  has implicitly  augmented 
the relative  supply  of  less  skilled  workers  in the U.S.  labor market. 
The  growth  of  such  trade has  accelerated  in  the  1990s,  with  LDC 
imports as a percentage of GDP rising from 2.3  percent in 1980 to 2.8 
percent in 1990 and to 4. 1 percent in 1996. Trade in manufactures with 
less  developed  countries  has the potential  to  affect  less  skilled  U.S. 
workers  adversely,  since,  as  illustrated  in table  4,  LDC  imports  are 
concentrated in industries that disproportionately employ less educated 
workers and exports to LDCs are found in industries that are much more 
skill intensive.  If the impact of LDC trade is concentrated on industries 
disproportionately  employing  high school  dropouts,  and if the appro- 
priate skill coefficients  to assess the effects  of such trade on the nation's 
factor proportions differ greatly from the average skill coefficients  used 
71.  Jaeger (1995). George J. Borjas, Richard  B. Freeman, and Lawrence F. Katz  57 
in most factor content studies,  LDC trade may have a significant effect 
on the  least  skilled  workers,  whose  relative  wages  have been  falling 
sharply  .72 
We  examine  the  implications  of  eliminating  trade with  LDCs  in 
manufactures,  using equation  18 under different assumptions concern- 
ing the skill-intensity  and productivity  of U.S.  production that would 
replace LDC imports. We first follow the standard practice of estimating 
the labor supply  embodied  in both LDC and developed  country trade 
flows  in a given  year,  using that year's  average unit labor coefficients 
for different skill groups of U.S.  production in the three-digit manufac- 
turing industries in which the imports and exports arise. More precisely, 
we estimate the implicit labor supply (in efficiency  units) of skill group 
k embodied  in trade in manufactures in year t as 
(20)  Tk, =  ek,,  LT,, 
where  ekl, is  the  proportion of  group  k (in  labor efficiency  units)  in 
industry I in year t; Li, is the total labor efficiency  units used in industry 
I in year t; and TR,,/S,,  is the ratio of imports less exports to shipments 
for industry I in year t. The proportional impact of trade on the labor 
supply of skill group k in year t is then given  by Tk,/Lk,  where Lk, is the 
total efficiency  units of group k (both natives and immigrants) employed 
in the aggregate U.S.  labor market in year t.73 
We  examine  imports  by  source  country  and exports  by  receiving 
country for manufactures measured at the three-digit industry level.  We 
classify  western European countries (except Greece and Portugal), Aus- 
tralia, New Zealand, Japan, and Canada as developed  countries and we 
include U.S.  trade flows with all other countries in the LDC trade flow 
aggregate. 
Table  16 shows  the effect  of  LDC and developed  country trade on 
72.  Thus  analyses  that aggregate  workers  into categories  such  as high  school  and 
college  equivalents  or  production  and  nonproduction  workers  and  assume  that LDC 
imports displace  domestic  production  at average  current sectoral  factor ratios (for ex- 
ample,  Sachs  and Shatz,  1994; Krugman,  1995a; and Lawrence,  1996) may understate 
the impact of LDC trade on the smaller but highly exposed  group of least skilled workers 
(that is,  high school  dropouts). 
73.  Since overall U.S.  trade and trade with LDCs in manufactures are not balanced, 
we  implicitly  assume  that any scale  (aggregate  demand)  effects  of  trade deficits  have 
skill-neutral effects  on labor demand. m  kr) m 
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labor supply by education  in  1980 and 1990,  using  the contemporary 
average  unit  labor coefficients  and following  the  approach of  equa- 
tion  18.  The  implicit  relative  labor supply  effects  of  trade are quite 
small in 1980 and increase only modestly  (0.007  log point) from 1980 
to  1990.  There  is  no  noticeable  change  in  the  impact  of  trade with 
developed  countries on relative labor supplies in this period. We there- 
fore  conclude  that it  is  likely  that any  possible  "action"  in  trade's 
impacts on different  skill  groups in the United States will  be found in 
the growing trade with LDCs-specifically,  in the surge of  1990-95- 
and will  only  be substantial if LDC trade displaces  activities  that use 
less  skilled  labor much more intensively  than is reflected  in contem- 
porary industry average labor skill coefficients. 
Table  17 presents  estimates  of  the implicit  effect  of LDC trade on 
labor supply by skill in  1980,  1990,  and 1995,  under three alternative 
counterfactuals:  "low,"  "middle,"  and "high".  In all three counter- 
factuals,  we assume that the reduction in domestic  production from the 
elimination  of exports to LDCs would occur at contemporary industry 
average skill shares and labor productivity.  Andrew Bernard and Jensen 
document that exporting plants are more productive and employ  a sub- 
stantially  larger  share  of  more  skilled  (nonproduction)  workers,  on 
average,  than other plants within  the same  four-digit  industry.74 The 
marginal production  affected  by reductions  in exports  is  likely  to be 
that of plants in the lower part of the skill  and labor productivity  dis- 
tribution of exporting plants. The average skill shares and productivity 
in the industry may be a reasonable proxy for these marginal exporting 
plants. The low counterfactual follows  table 16 in assuming that imports 
and exports both embody labor supply at contemporary industry average 
skill  intensities  and productivity.  The middle  counterfactual  assumes 
that the implicit labor efficiency  units from LDC imports in each three- 
digit  industry  are replaced  by  domestic  production  using  production 
methods lagged by ten to fifteen years,  which typically  utilize  a larger 
share of  less  educated  labor than contemporary industry average skill 
shares.  The high counterfactual  assumes  that domestic  production re- 
places  LDC  imports by using  average  industry skill  shares and labor 
productivity  from  1970  (before  the growth of  LDC  imports in manu- 
factures),  and that consumers  have inelastic  demand for the goods,  so 
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that the increase in domestic output  to replace imports  equals the real 
output  contained  in imports.  The assumptions  of no technological  prog- 
ress since 1970 and  inelastic consumer  demand  are  extreme. We believe 
that the middle counterfactual  is the most realistic of the three. 
The estimates of the impact  on relative labor supplies of LDC trade 
under the middle and high counterfactuals  in table 17 suggest much 
greater  effects of the growth  of LDC trade  on educational  wage differ- 
entials than does the assumption  that LDC trade displaces domestic 
output  at current  average  unit labor input  coefficients. The middle and 
high counterfactuals  imply that LDC trade  augmented  the relative sup- 
ply of dropouts  by 0.04 to 0.10  log point in 1995.75  Under these as- 
sumptions,  the elimination  of LDC trade  in 1995 would have increased 
the relative wage of dropouts  by 0.012 to 0.033 log point, given our 
assumed  relative wage elasticity of -  0.322. The effects are  larger  than 
in table 16, but still modest, for the supply of high school equivalents 
relative  to college equivalents  under  our  preferred  middle  counterfactual. 
Summarizing the Contributions of Immigration and Trade 
Table 18 summarizes  our aggregate  factor proportions  estimates of 
the contributions  of the post-1979 immigration  and LDC trade shocks 
to changes in educational  wage differentials  from 1980 to 1995, under 
different assumptions about the responsiveness of relative wages to 
changes in relative skill supplies. We examine the counterfactual  of 
cutting off all immigration  and all growth  in trade  flows with LDCs in 
January 1,  1980. Thus we present the implied wage effects of  1995 
changes in skill supplies of immigrants  who arrived  after 1979 and of 
the implicit labor supplies embodied  in the change in LDC trade  flows 
between 1980 and 1995. 
75.  Our  estimates  of the effects of LDC trade  on the implicit  relative  supply  of high 
school dropouts  in 1990 under  the high counterfactual  are roughly similar to Wood's 
(1995) estimates of the impact of LDC trade  on unskilled workers  for the same year, 
using adjusted  LDC-based labor input coefficients. Wood estimates that LDC trade 
reduced  the demand  for skilled relative to unskilled workers  in manufactures  by 21.5 
percent  (0.20 log point). If we normalize  our implicit  labor  supply  effects of LDC trade 
in 1990 by labor efficiency units by skill group in manufacturing,  rather  than in the 
entire  economy, we obtain  an relative  labor  supply increasing  effect (and relative  labor 
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Table 18. Estimated  Contributions  of Immigration  and LDC Trade to Growth  in Log 
Wage Differentials,  1980-95a 
Log points, except as indicated 
Wage comparison 
High school graduates  College  versus high school 
Item  versus dropouts  graduates 
Assumed wage elasticity  -0.2  -0.322  -0.4  -0.5  -0.709  -I 
Actual change,  1980-95  0.109  0.109  0.109  0.191  0.191  0.191 
Estimated contribution 
Post-1979  immigration  0.030  0.048  0.060  0.007  0.009  0.013 
LDC trade  0.006  0.009  0.012  0.007  0.010  0.014 
Immigration plus trade  0.036  0.057  0.072  0.014  0.019  0.027 
Percent contributionb 
Post-1979  immigration  27  44  55  3  5  7 
LDC trade  6  8  11  4  5  7 
Immigration plus trade  33  52  66  7  10  14 
Source: Authors' calculations based on model described in text. Actual changes in log wage differentials are froni table 
12. Contribution of post- 1979 immiiigration  to labor supply is from table 14. Contribution  of LDC trade to labor supply is a 
difference over  1980-95,  from table 17, using the middle counterfactual. 
a.  Wage differentials are measured as differences  in adjusted log  wages,  as described in the text.  Actual change in 
differentials is expressed in log points, as are individual contributions. 
b. Log point contribution of iteim  as percentage of actual log point change,  1980-95. 
This  table  highlights  the  fact  that immigration  has  a much  larger 
impact on U.S.  native high school  dropouts than does LDC trade. The 
impact of post- 1979 immigrants on relative skill supplies can explain a 
0.030  to 0.060  log point decline  (27 to 55 percent of the actual decline) 
in the relative wages of high school dropouts over 1980-95,  depending 
on the wage elasticity  chosen.  Increased LDC trade, under our preferred 
middle  counterfactual  and the  -0.322  wage  elasticity,  explains  less 
than  10 percent of  the declining  relative  wage  of dropouts.  The table 
also  shows  that immigration  and LDC  trade have  similar,  relatively 
modest  effects  on the college-high  school  wage  differential.  In com- 
bination,  they  probably  account  for  no  more  than  10 percent  of  the 
large,  0. 191 log point increase in this differential  from  1980 to  1995. 
This paper asks how much immigration and trade affect labor market 
outcomes.  Our answer is that the impact of increased immigration and 
LDC trade on the labor market does  not explain  much of the increase 
in the college  wage premium or overall  wage  inequality  in the United 
States.  Other factors-such  as an acceleration  of  skill-biased  techno- 
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college  graduates,  and institutional  changes  in the labor market-are 
probably more important than immigration and trade in explaining  the 
widening  of  the  U.S.  wage  structure since  the  late  1970s.  But  the 
concentration  of  immigration  and trade at the  lower  end  of  the  skill 
distribution does explain an important part of the decline  in the relative 
wage  of  high  school  dropouts.  The  reason  is  that a disproportionate 
share of  immigrants has less  than a high  school  education,  and a dis- 
proportionate and rising  share of  imports is from sectors  that employ 
such workers.  Moreover,  as in our earlier work, we find that immigra- 
tion has a larger impact on less  educated workers than does trade.76 
Toward a Full Accounting  of the Effects of Immigration 
In standard models  of  immigration  and trade, the income  losses  of 
natives  who  compete  with  immigrants or with  imports are more than 
matched by the income gains of natives whose  skills or capital comple- 
ment those of immigrants or of imports. How large might these effects 
be? Since  capital is a likely  beneficiary of immigration,  we take a step 
toward a fuller accounting  of the distributional effects  of immigration 
by extending  our two-input  (skilled  and unskilled  labor) model  to in- 
corporate  capital  as  a  third factor.  We  use  this  extended  model  to 
simulate the distributional and efficiency  impacts of the post- 1979 im- 
migration  flow  and to check  whether the conclusion  that immigration 
explains  much of the declining  relative  wage  of high school  dropouts 
holds up in such a framework.77 
Suppose  that one can represent the U.S.  economy  by an aggregate 
production  function f[K,  bN,  (1  -  b)N],  where K is capital,  N gives 
the number of  workers,  and b gives  the fraction of  workers who  are 
skilled.  We assume that the production function has constant returns to 
scale and that natives own the capital stock.  Then in a preimmigration 
regime,  the national income  accruing to native workers is 
(20)  QN =fKK  +fs  bN  +  f,(l  -  b)N, 
76.  Borjas,  Freeman,  and Katz (1992). 
77.  We  concentrate  on  immigration  both  because  our  analysis  suggests  that  the 
distributional  effects  of  immigration  are  larger  than  those  of  trade  and  because  the 
persistent  trade  imbalances  and  large  volume  of  intraindustry trade mean  that a  full 
accounting  of  trade's  effects  would  take us far beyond  the labor market focus  of  this 
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wheref  is the marginal product of input i, and S and U represent skilled 
and unskilled labor, respectively.  The total increase in national income 
accruing to natives when the United States admits M immigrants equals 
(21)  AQN =  (  afK  +  bN afs +  (1 -b)N afu M. 
am  am  a 
Assume  that a fraction  3 of immigrants are skilled.  Suppose,  initially, 
that capital is infinitely elastic,  so that afKlaM  is zero. Then if  a  equals 
b,  immigration  does  not  alter the  relative  factor  ratio in the  United 
States and natives  neither lose nor gain from immigration (AQN  is zero 
because all the terms in equation 21 vanish).  Because the price of capital 
is fixed,  immigration can only  affect  native incomes  when  A  does  not 
equal  b.  The  United  States  has  been  admitting  immigrants  who,  on 
average,  are less skilled than native workers. Thus A  is less than b, and 
there are both gains  and losses  from immigration; the winners  are the 
skilled  workers and the losers  are the unskilled  workers.  The net gain 
to natives,  however,  is positive.78 
Some  studies  of  immigration  assume  that the capital  stock  (rather 
than the price  of  capital)  is  fixed.  In this case,  there would  be a net 
gain to the United  States  from immigration,  even  when  A  equaled  b. 
The gains  would  accrue to native-owned  capital.  In terms of equation 
21,  K afKlaM  would be positive,  and the gains to skilled  and unskilled 
workers would  depend on the own effects  of  shifts  in supply,  as well 
as on the cross-effects  among the three inputs. 
Equation 21 can be evaluated numerically if one makes assumptions 
about the responsiveness  of  factor prices  to an increase  in immigrant 
labor supply.  We simulate the model in this equation by using the two 
polar  assumptions  about  capital  and a  set  of  assumptions  about the 
responsiveness  of factor prices to immigration.  In particular, let Ei be 
the factor price elasticity  a lnfi/a  ln X., where X. is the quantity of input 
j.  Daniel  Hamermesh  surveys  an extensive  literature that attempts to 
estimate  these  elasticities.79  We  used  a variety  of  assumptions  about 
these elasticities  from the range that he provides.  The simulation  pre- 
78.  Borjas  (1995)  discusses  the  economic  benefits  from  immigration  using  this 
framework and presents a more detailed  discussion  of the algebra underlying the simu- 
lations presented below. 
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Table 19. Simulated  Costs and Benefits  of Post-1979  Immigrationa 
Holding price  Holding capital 
Item  of capital fixed  stock fixed 
Percent change in earnings 
Capital  .  ..  6.50 
Skilled native workers  0.35  -  2.49 
Unskilled native workers  -4.64  -4.57 
Percent change in skilled-to-unskilled earnings ratio  4.99  2.08 
Percent change in total native earnings  0.05  0.13 
Dollar GDP gain, assuming $7 trillion GDP  3.5  billion  9. 1 billion 
Source: Authors' calculations based on model described in text. Data on factor GDP shares are from Autor. Katz, and 
Krueger ( 1997. table A I ). 
a. Changes relative to counterfactual of no immigration after 1979. 
sented below  uses estimates  from the upper end of this range.  Simula- 
tions based on smaller estimates yield both miniscule  benefits and min- 
iscule costs of immigration.  In particular, we assume that Ess  =  -  1.5, 
Euu  =  -0.8,  and Esu  =  0.05.80  This  assumption  builds  capital-skill 
complementarity  into the calculations. 
The simulation requires estimates of the parameters b and  3, as well 
as of the share of income  accruing to each of the factors.  We estimate 
these  parameters from the  1995 CPS,  MORG files.  We define  skilled 
workers as those having at least a high school  education and unskilled 
workers as high school  dropouts. The  1995 CPS then implies  that b is 
0.91  and  3 is 0.68  for immigrants who entered after 1979.  We make 
the standard assumption that the labor share of income (for all workers) 
is  0.7.  Using  data from the  study by  Autor,  Katz,  and Krueger,  we 
estimate  that the  skilled  worker  share of  GDP  is  0.661  and that of 
unskilled  workers is 0.039.81  Finally,  we  need an estimate  of the im- 
migrant supply shock. The 1995 CPS implies that post- 1979 immigrants 
increased labor supply,  in terms of full-time equivalent workers, by 5.5 
percent. 
Table 19 reports the simulation results, using both polar assumptions 
about capital. The first column of data gives the results when we assume 
that the price of  capital  is fixed (so  that capital adjusts completely  to 
the entry of  immigrants).  In this case,  unskilled  workers suffer  a 4.6 
80.  These  assumptions  determine all the other elasticities  in the model,  because  of 
the mathematical property that the relevant weighted  average of factor price elasticities 
is zero. 
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percent  decline  in  earnings,  whereas  skilled  workers  gain  about 0.4 
percent. This produces a change in the relative wage of these two groups 
of 5.0  percent,  the same magnitude as estimated in our middle case  in 
table 18. This redistribution generates a net gain for the U.S.  economy 
of 0.05  percent of GDP, or roughly $3.5  billion per year in a $7 trillion 
economy.  The  second  column  gives  the results when we  assume  that 
the capital stock is fixed.  In this case,  the main beneficiary of immigra- 
tion is native-owned  capital.  The capitalists  experience  a 6.5  percent 
increase  in  income,  while  both  skilled  and unskilled  workers  suffer 
losses:  2.5  percent and 4.6  percent,  respectively.  The wage of skilled 
relative  to unskilled  workers changes  by 2.1  percent.  The net gain to 
the economy  is 0. 13 percent, which roughly translates into $9. 1 billion 
a year.  The simulation  therefore reveals  that the economic  gains from 
immigration are small in such a massive  economy.82 
It is worth emphasizing  that this simulation assumes that all workers 
within a given  skill group are perfect substitutes.  A more general anal- 
ysis would take into account complementarities that might exist between 
some immigrants (such as those with fewer than nine years of schooling 
or those with specialized  training) and some native workers. Such com- 
plementarities  would  increase  the  gains  to  the  U.S.  economy  from 
immigration.  A more complete  model would also allow for gains from 
increased  product variety  associated  with  immigration.  But our esti- 
mates  may  also  overstate  the  "true"  gain  because  they  ignore  the 
possibility  that trade would  substitute for immigration if fewer  immi- 
grants had entered the country.  The bottom line from our simulations 
is that the economic  impact of  immigration  is mainly  redistributional 
and primarily affects  a small  group of  the least educated U.S.  native 
workers. 
Conclusions 
In the past two or three decades there has been a substantial growth 
in immigration and trade between the United States and the less devel- 
oped countries.  The large flow of less educated immigrants from LDCs 
and the rapid growth in U.S.  imports of LDC manufactured goods  has 
82.  Johnson  (1997b)  concludes  from  a similar  but more detailed  analysis  that the 
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increased  the effective  supply  of  less  educated  labor relative  to more 
educated labor in the United States.  This,  in turn, has raised questions 
about the potential contribution of trade and immigration to the rise in 
the wage differential  between  more and less educated workers. 
Determining  the effects  of immigration and trade on economic  out- 
comes  is  difficult.  It is  difficult  because  immigration  and trade may 
have  an effect  on national  labor market outcomes  without greatly  af- 
fecting  relative  outcomes  in the regions  most immediately  touched by 
trade flows  or immigrant flows.  It is also difficult because many other 
factors affect the U.S.  job market; without adequate controls for those 
factors,  the influence of immigration or trade can be hard to discern in 
a given  body of data. And,  most important, it is difficult because  one 
must specify  a realistic counterfactual of how the economy  would have 
developed,  how  native  labor would  have acted,  and how firms would 
have  produced  goods,  in the  absence  of  the relevant  immigration  or 
trade flows.  These  counterfactuals,  in turn, require good  estimates  of 
the magnitudes  of various economic  parameters. 
In this paper,  we  try to specify  appropriate counterfactuals  and to 
quantify the potential  effects  of  immigration  and trade with different 
estimated  or postulated  parameters.  We  conclude  that the  effects  of 
immigration  and trade flows  on relative  skill  supplies  have  not been 
substantial enough  to account for more than a small proportion of the 
overall  widening  of the wage  structure over the past fifteen years and 
have  played  only  a modest  role in the expansion  of the college-high 
school  wage  differential  in the United States.  Under various plausible 
specifications,  the main adverse effect of immigration and trade on U . S. 
native outcomes falls on workers with less than a high school education: 
the combined  effects  of immigration and trade may explain half of the 
decline  of the relative  wages  of high school  dropouts since  1980.  Im- 
migration  has  a particularly  large  impact  on  the  outcomes  for  these 
workers because  the flow of less educated immigrants into the country 
has been substantial; immigration increased the relative supply of work- 
ers with  less  than a high  school  degree  by  15 to 20  percent over  the 
period 1980-95.  Increased trade from LDCs appears to have been much 
less  important than immigration for the relative earnings of low-wage 
U.S.  workers. Comments  and 
Discussion 
John  DiNardo:  Trade and immigration policy  are each  small  aspects 
of  a broader issue:  how  do  we,  or the  government,  treat those  who 
happen  to  have  been  born outside  the  geographic  boundaries  of  the 
United States? Given the scope of the subject, it should not be surprising 
that economists  can play a small role,  at best,  in informing the larger 
issues  that the question implies. 
Moreover,  when one asks the more narrow question-what  has been 
the impact of immigration and trade on the economic  well-being  of the 
native-born worker?-the  implied ceteris paribus, holding other polit- 
ical and economic  institutions  constant,  is quite important. One might 
well  expect  increased immigration or trade to have very different con- 
sequences  under very  different  institutions.  Even  defining  the  issue 
narrowly in this way leaves  many questions  of interest to economists. 
This contribution by George Borjas, Richard Freeman, and Lawrence 
Katz elaborates substantially on their previous work: they undertake to 
develop  a conceptual model that seeks,  inter alia, to explain the degree 
of  wage  inequality  experienced  by both the U.S.  native-born  and by 
immigrants to the United States.  The paper paints with a broad brush. 
The period  1960-90  has seen a great deal of change that has made an 
impact  on  labor markets: the rise  of  civil  rights  and women's  rights 
movements  and the decline  of unionism,  to name a few.  Borjas,  Free- 
man, and Katz, among themselves,  have documented the effect of many 
of  these  changes  in other research; here they  train their focus  on the 
impact of trade and immigration on the structure of wages. 
My focus  is the authors' critique of other researchers' work on im- 
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migration. A  substantial portion of  the paper is  a critique of  what 
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz refer to as area studies; notably, work by 
Joseph  Altonji and  Card,  Robert  LaLonde  and  Robert  Topel, and  Robert 
Schoeni that  provides  evidence against  the view that  recent  immigration 
has disadvantaged  native-born workers.' The paper also reexamines 
issues analyzed in related work by Kristin Butcher, Card, Frey, and 
Liaw.2  Because of the quality  of the empirical  work  in the present  paper 
and in the others  cited, it is easier than  usual to focus more  on what  the 
facts mean than  on what the facts are.  Indeed, this paper  and  those that 
it critiques have several "facts" in common! In particular,  all agree 
that wage changes across states, cities, or other regions and over time 
have essentially been uncorrelated  with the changes in the number  or 
fraction of immigrants  living in a particular  place. Further  adding to 
the muddle  for a dispassionate  outsider, although  Borjas, Freeman,  and 
Katz  critique  area  analyses, they bolster  their  case with an area  analysis 
of their own. 
Where, then, is the disagreement?  In this paper Borjas, Freeman, 
and Katz seem to differ from other  researchers  in answer  to the follow- 
ing question: how much of the observed disparity  in economic status 
can be parsimoniously  described  as the outcome  of shifts in the relative 
demand  and supply of workers  of different "skills" -that  is, years of 
work  experience  and  formal  education-in  a competitive  labor  market? 
To answer this question, the authors'  aggregate  proportions  approach 
and  the area  analyses  it critiques  focus on a relationship  of the following 
sort: 
(A1)  Aln (t)  =  -BAIln 
x 
Here, B is a parameter,  x denotes total employment  of skill group s or 
u at time t, w denotes  average  wage, and  A denotes  that  a time difference 
of the data has been taken. The aggregate proportions  approach  and 
area analysis differ somewhat  from this simple framework.  For exam- 
ple, on the one hand, the area analyses surveyed allow for a greater 
number  of skill categories, and the variables are additionally  indexed 
by standard  metropolitan  statistical area (SMSA) or city. On the other 
1. Altonji and Card  (1991); LaLonde  and Topel (1991); Schoeni (1996). 
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hand, the aggregate proportions approach includes  "trade-embodied" 
employment  in xS, and x,,,, and there are also other differences.  None- 
theless,  the theoretical  models  being  assumed or tested  share the fol- 
lowing  property: when the number of workers-measured  as the pro- 
portion  of workers of  a given  type-rises,  the wage  of those  workers 
relative  to other workers falls  (or is predicted to fall). 
How does this relate to the economic  impact of immigration (or trade) 
on  labor  market outcomes?  In both  area analysis  and the  aggregate 
proportions  approach,  immigration  and trade affect  relative  wages 
by  changing  the  term  on  the  right-hand  side,  xS,/x,t.  For  example, 
the simple  model  predicts that if the diversity  of  immigrant  "types" 
matches  the  diversity  of  types  among  the  native-born,  immigration 
would have little or no effect. 
The work that Borjas,  Freeman,  and Katz critique  attempts to test 
this relationship  by observing  that immigrants do not settle uniformly 
across  SMSAs  or cities.  The  area analyses  by  Altonji,  Card,  and 
Schoeni  compare the immigration-induced  changes  in the proportions 
of different skill types to changes in relative wages of these skill types 
across  SMSAs.3  They  find estimates  that are small  in magnitude;  al- 
though fairly precise,  these estimates  are rarely different from zero at 
conventional  levels  of significance. 
Likewise,  in table 7 of  the present paper,  those  specifications  that 
are most analogous to these area analyses show much the same pattern. 
At  levels  of  aggregation  much  broader than those  used  by  Card and 
Schoeni,  however,  the  estimates  vary  widely  and  sign  patterns  are 
inconsistent,  with the standard errors generally rising as the geographic 
area under consideration  becomes  larger. (Due to the limitations of the 
census data, only relatively  broad levels  of aggregation can be straight- 
forwardly compared across the entire period  1950-90.) 
Notwithstanding  these differences,  Borjas,  Freeman, and Katz, like 
Card,  conclude  that "immigration  is  not a major determinant of  the 
regional  structure of labor market outcomes  for natives."  They argue, 
however,  that this  finding  should  not militate  against  the conclusion 
that the inflows of foreign-born workers to the United States have been 
an important cause of the fall in the wages  of workers with less  than a 
high  school  education.  Furthermore, given  "plausible"  estimates  of 
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labor demand parameters,  the  simple  supply  and demand framework 
used in their simulations  suggests  that the wages  of workers with less 
than a high school  education may have been greatly affected. 
Given  the structure of the simplest  supply and demand framework, 
one  explanation  for this  finding  is  that immigration  does  not  induce 
changes  in the relative  supplies  of  skill  types  across regions.  That is, 
the small response observed on one margin (wages)  might be the result 
of a big response on another (native migration).  Indeed, if the elasticity 
of  native  outflow  of  skill  type  k with respect  to  immigrant inflow  of 
skill  type  k is  unity,  and if  the  supply  and demand model  is  a good 
description  of  the data,  then zero  measured wage  effects  across  geo- 
graphic areas is exactly  what one would predict. 
It would  be  quite  surprising  if  this  elasticity  were  large,  as  such 
"skating  rink"  migration is little  noticed  in the demographics  or eco- 
nomics  literature.  Randall  Filer  observes  that  "there  has  been  little 
previous work dealing with the relation between immigrant arrivals and 
native migratory patterns."4 In my experience,  a large elasticity  is hard 
to find. 
Moreover,  if native-born migration "undoes"  the effect of immigra- 
tion, it creates two new puzzles.  First, as Borjas puts it, an "unresolved 
puzzle  facing  those  who  interpret the lack of correlation between  im- 
migration  and native  wages  in the local  labor market in terms of  an 
economy-wide  equilibrium process is clear: Why should it be that many 
other regional  variations persist over time,  but that the impact of  im- 
migration  on  native  workers  is  arbitraged away  immediately?"5  The 
empirical  literature is  replete  with  examples  of  regional  shocks  that 
appear to be persistent and resistant to migration arbitrage by the native- 
born.  Evidence  on  the economic  fortunes  of  displaced  workers  have 
consistently  found  enduring effects  of  labor market conditions  at the 
time  of  displacement  on  wages,  for example.  Olivier  Blanchard and 
Katz conclude that a one-time adverse shock reduces a state's real wage 
for up to ten years before internal migration reequilibrates wages.6 
The  second  puzzle  is  the  mechanism  by  which  internal migration 
diffuses  immigrant  shocks.  In  the  context  of  equation  Al,  internal 
migration mitigates  the observed  regional  variation induced by immi- 
4.  Filer (1992,  p. 245). 
5.  Borjas (1994,  p.  1700). 
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gration only  to the extent  that it undoes  changes  in skill  shares.  Yet 
Card finds that when low-skilled  immigrants, for example,  arrive in an 
SMSA,  the  proportion  of  low-skilled  workers  (both  immigrant  and 
native-born) in that SMSA  rises slightly  more than by one for one.7 
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz take up this part of the puzzle in table 11, 
by attempting to test directly whether immigration changes factor pro- 
portions within a state. Using state-level  data, they find that their results 
are quite sensitive  to the "appropriate"  choice  of counterfactual.  As a 
practical matter, this amounts to whether they employ  first differences 
(comparing  changes  across adjacent censuses),  "double  differences" 
(comparing  1950-70  differences  to  1970-90  differences),  or double 
differences  with an initial conditions  control (a value for the proportion 
of a particular skill group in 1950). 
The key parameter that the authors estimate in equation 11, d, takes 
a value of one if native migration flow is unresponsive  to immigration 
inflow,  and zero if natives  leave  an area at a rate of one for one with 
an increase in the number of immigrants in that area. In this latter case, 
increased  migration  from  abroad for a particular skill  group is  com- 
pletely off-set by increased out-migration by natives, leaving skill ratios 
untouched.  The  authors'  preferred  specification  (double  differences 
with  a control  for  1950  skill  levels)  does  include  this  latter case  in 
conventional  confidence  intervals. 
However,  their estimates  range from a high of 2.8  (with a standard 
error of  1.2) to a low of  -0.34  (with a standard error of 0.30).  Indeed, 
in more than half of their sixteen  specifications,  which they helpfully 
report, the coefficient  is not significantly  different from one.  That is, 
an increased  flow  of  foreign-born  individuals  has no migration effect 
on the native  population.  These  can be contrasted with the results of 
Card, who,  using finer geographic groupings,  unrestricted city effects, 
and data from the period  1985-90,  finds estimates  of about 1. 18 (with 
a standard error of  0.03)  for  a similar  parameter,  even  after use  of 
instrumental variables estimators.8 
It is useful  to recall the authors' statement regarding the attempt to 
find wage  effects  of  immigration  through  area analysis:  doing  so  is 
difficult "unless  [one] can control for the forces that caused the regional 
7.  Card (1997). 
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wage  structure to change  .  .  . over time."  This argument would seem 
to apply with equal or more force in regard  to migration  across states 
over a forty-year  time frame. Consider  interstate  migration  during  the 
period 1985-90. Florida,  which Frey  labels a high "internal  migration" 
state, also received more foreign-born  migrants  than any state besides 
California  and  New York.9  The reasons  for the native and foreign-born 
migrations  are likely quite different  and seem hard  to uncover  by look- 
ing at state-level data. For example, within Florida, Miami is clearly 
dominated  by immigration  from abroad, whereas metropolitan  areas 
such as Tampa-St. Petersburg,  West Palm Beach, Fort Meyers, and 
Daytona  Beach are  dominated  by internal  migration.  Within  California, 
Los Angeles saw the biggest increase in foreign-born  residents and 
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substantial  out-migration  by natives. San Diego, by contrast,  saw high 
levels of immigration  by both the foreign- and the native-born. 
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz do not overstate their results, and I do 
not wish to overstate  this criticism. While some conflicting  results  seem 
potentially  reconcilable-Card and  Frey  differ in their  treatment  of city 
fixed  effects, for example-Filer's  analysis  is not as easy to reconcile.  '0 
The evidence seems to suggest that a city or SMSA analysis with city 
fixed effects may be more appropriate  than a state-level analysis with 
state  fixed effects, but  that  is only one way of tying up disparate  results. 
In short, although the authors' analysis of migration  is helpful, I am 
not sure that it convincingly demonstrates  that the United States is 
currently  experiencing  a "new white flight," as Frey describes  it, nor 
that such a native-born  migration  is the reason why area  analyses have 
not been able to find an effect of immigration  on the wages of the 
native-born.  " 
Even if migration  arbitrage  is not occurring, other mechanisms  for 
arbitrage  do exist. Indeed, the trade  literature  may provide  insight into 
immigration  literature,  as it is flush  with possible mechanisms  that  may 
have implications that can be tested in state-level or SMSA analyses. 
Schoeni finds evidence suggesting that relative prices of goods across 
SMSAs are empirically important  in analyzing regional wage differ- 
entials.  12 This seems a potentially  fruitful  area  of inquiry. 
As to the aggregate  proportions  approach,  I am reluctant  to conclude 
that it provides a more reliable way of predicting  the impact of immi- 
gration on relative wages. The authors' simulations are based on the 
assumption  that  the principal  mechanism  by which immigration  affects 
wages is shifting labor supply along a demand curve. Maybe this is 
correct;  however, the approach  provides no independent  testable pre- 
dictions. It can only be confirmed  by the extent to which it is in accord 
with a priori  beliefs about  the size and directions  of the effects. Sharp 
tests of the general-equilibrium  approach  taken in the paper are rare, 
perhaps  largely because they are difficult or impossible. 
I have one final concern, regarding  the "macro" facts about wage 
inequality  that  need to be explained. This concern  stems  from important 
differences in the evolution of the distribution  of wages for men and 
10.  Card (1997);  Frey (1995a);  Filer (1992). 
1  1.  Frey ( 1  994). 
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women.  In my own  work with  Kristin Butcher,  we  find that the pat- 
terns of wages  changes  for the native-born relative to those for immi- 
grants since  the late  1970s  (the period in which changes  in wages  and 
immigration have been most dramatic) are quite different for men and 
women.'3  Several  of  the authors' findings are suggestive  of this fact. 
Perhaps, as they suggest,  the more comparable treatment of women and 
men since the popular upheavals that began in the 1960s have played a 
role. 
Recent work by Nicole  Fortin and Thomas Lemieux provides further 
indication of important differences  in the evolution  of men's and wom- 
en's  wages.'4  They  find, for example,  that when  men's  and women's 
wages  are examined  together,  inequality  in wages  has changed  very 
little  since  the  late  1970s,  apart from  a minimum  wage  effect.  Fig- 
ure Al  presents  estimates  of  the distribution of  (hours-weighted)  log 
wages in 1979 and 1991 (in 1991 dollars) for men and women together, 
based on CPS,  MORG data. Figure A2,  which displays  wage distribu- 
tions by sex,  makes clear that the modest change depicted in figure Al 
is the result of very different changes in the distributions of men's  and 
women's  wages. 
In sum,  the  common  thread of  this  paper and the research that it 
critiques appears to be that the increase in the foreign-born population 
can,  at best,  explain  a small portion of  the changes  depicted  in these 
figures and other changes  in the wage  structure over the period  1960- 
90.  As the authors suggest,  theirs are not the "final words."  However, 
by carefully  laying  out so many new facts  and reexamining  some  old 
ones,  they have raised some new questions  that deserve  answers. 
John M. Abowd:  In contrast to DiNardo,  I have something to say about 
the trade segment of this paper. Nevertheless  I, too, focus my attention 
on the immigrant side of the paper. 
One can think of this paper as the authors' attempt to resolve  some 
of  the questions  that they raise  in their  1996  paper for the American 
Economic  Review and, earlier,  in their 1992 paper; and, indeed,  some 
of the questions  that each of them raise in a variety of research on this 
subject. ' What they are trying to do in the immigration section  of this 
13.  Butcher and DiNardo  (1997). 
14.  Fortin and Lemieux  (1996). 
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paper-and  I wish  that I could  interpret the  trade section  the  same 
way-is  to press hard on the data to find an empirical or natural exper- 
iment that they can use to assess the labor market effects  of immigration 
in the United States.  In their own words,  the object of their 1996 paper 
is to estimate the effect of immigration on native labor outcomes,  which 
depends critically  on the empirical experiment used to assess  immigra- 
tion.  Thus one  can think of the current paper as a serious  assessment 
of a variety of ways  of thinking about that natural experiment. 
The  conclusion  that one's  measure  of  the  effects  of  immigration 
depends  on  the  type  of  natural experiment  used  was  a direct  conse- 
quence of finding that cross-sectional  analyses for native wage rates in 
the  1980 and 1990 census  produce very different estimated effects  for 
males.  The  authors'  attempts to  explain  these  differences,  using  the 
changes  between  the two censuses,  also failed.  The early tables of the 
present paper confirms these conclusions.  The authors now claim that 
area-based studies  of immigration effects,  such as their earlier papers 
and a large  number of  papers that DiNardo  mentions,  miss  the mark 
because  there is consistent  evidence  that the effects  of immigration to 
a specific  geographic  area are diffused  to the rest of the economy. 
In the present paper, the authors also  attempt to refine their earlier 
estimates  of  the  aggregate  effects  on  implicit  labor supply  from  net 
trade. In this regard, I think that their conclusions,  although subjected 
to more sensitivity  analyses  than the conclusions  of  their early work, 
are not greatly  modified.  They  do not address some  of  the criticisms 
that have  been  leveled  at that technique,  but they  know  this.  If one 
accepts  their view  of  the way  in which  international trade affects  do- 
mestic factor markets-that  is, factor price equalization does not occur 
in the labor market-their  diagnostics  are reasonably convincing. 
My brief summary of the paper is as follows.  First, the total gain to 
U.S.  GDP from immigration is trivial.  Specifically,  the net gain to the 
economy  is somewhere  between  $3.5  billion  and $9.1  billion  on a $7 
trillion economy.  But the redistributional effects,  according to the au- 
thors' methods of assessment,  fall almost entirely on unskilled workers 
and are responsible  for about 40  percent of  the real wage  decline  of 
high school  dropouts compared with those  with at least a high  school 
diploma.  That is a significant  finding.  The paper emphasizes  that this 
is a good ballpark estimate  for the redistributional effects  of immigra- 
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Although there is no attempt to estimate the total gain to U.S.  GNP 
from trade, the estimated redistributional effects  account for only about 
8 percent of  the real wage  decline  of  high school  dropouts compared 
with those with at least a high school  diploma.  So,  the trade effects  are 
considerably  smaller than those of immigration; and that is not incon- 
sistent with their earlier work on the subject,  although it is inconsistent 
with some of the work that has been produced by some of the authors' 
competitors. 
From the analysis  of wage  gains for those with a college  degree  or 
more,  compared with those with a high school  diploma,  the effects  of 
immigration  and trade are found  to be roughly  comparable,  with  the 
same orders of magnitude,  but very small-only  about 5 percent in the 
authors' preferred estimate-and  the variation in these effects  is much 
smaller.  I think it would  be fair to say that they conclude  that for the 
groups above  the lowest  skilled  group,  the effects  of trade and immi- 
gration are relatively  modest. 
The  section  on  immigration  and the distribution  of  wages  lies  the 
heart of the new analyses  that are presented in the paper. The starting 
point is the observation  that area-based immigration  studies  find very 
different  results,  depending  on their specification  and time period.  In 
postmodern terminology,  this conundrum reflects the need to be precise 
about the counterfactual  and the natural experiment-although,  econ- 
omists used to say just that the conclusion  was sensitive  to the dates or 
to the functional  form of the regression  analysis. 
In the area studies,  it is well documented that six states have received 
essentially  all  of  the immigrants for decades:  California,  New  York, 
New  Jersey,  Texas,  Illinois,  and Florida. The authors' wrinkle here is 
to  document  that one  can  form  a  natural experiment  by  comparing 
California  to  either  the  other immigrant-receiving  states  or all  other 
(nonimmigrant) states.  In their natural experiment,  the authors apply a 
slightly  different  treatment to California,  to  all the other immigrant- 
receiving  states,  and to all the other states. 
Consider  table  8,  which  reports the regional  distribution of  native 
and immigrant populations since  1950. This table shows that the percent 
of  all  immigrants  in the United  States  living  in California  rose  from 
10.4  percent in  1950  to 33.8  percent in  1990.  Over the same period, 
this proportion fell  slightly  (from 44.4  percent to 40.0  percent) in the 
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to 26. 1 percent) in all other states.  From 1950 to  1970 the percent of 
all U.S.  natives  living  in California also rose (from 6.9  percent to 9.6 
percent),  whereas it was stable in the other immigrant-receiving  states 
(25.4  percent to 26.2  percent) and fell  slightly  in the other states (from 
67.7  percent to 64.2  percent).  In the period  1970-90,  the percentages 
of the native-born population in each of the three regions was essentially 
stable.  That fact  is critical  for the way that the authors formulate the 
natural experiment  at this aggregated level. 
These facts motivate an analysis that asks what the labor markets in 
California,  in  the  other immigrant-receiving  states,  and in the  other 
states would  have  looked  like  if the  1970-90  immigration  shock  had 
not occurred  and the native  population  growth rates over  this  period 
mirrored the growth rates in the 1960 to 1970 period. This restatemcnt 
of  the counterfactual  is important for reasons  documented  in tables  6 
and 7.  These  two  tables  show  that immigrant flows  into the different 
areas and education cells,  which are the formalization of using Califor- 
nia and the other immigrant-receiving  states as the treatment groups for 
the natural experiment,  do not have a consistent  relation to the changes 
in native  earnings.  This  is  the  authors' way  of  summarizing  the fact 
that the shock-viewed  as a shock to the area labor market or the area 
skilled labor market-has  no consistent,  predictable effect  on the earn- 
ings of the shocked groups within those areas. 
In particular, table 7, which reports the results of estimating equation 
4,  shows  that the area-education shock in immigration has a measured 
association  with the adjusted change in the area-education earnings and 
employment  outcomes  that shows no consistent  pattern. Think of table 
7 as the authors' best attempt to control for other factors in the change 
analysis.  Here, one treats the shock to the area education-specific  mar- 
ket  as  coming  directly  from  the  immigration  of  comparably  skilled 
people  into the labor market. 
The authors correctly interpret the widely varying coefficients,  which 
confirm the  visual  conclusion  from the  simple  natural experiment  in 
table 6,  as implying  that interpreting an area education increase in the 
immigrant population as a labor supply shock to an area education labor 
market is simply  inconsistent  with the data. 
Table 8 restates the counterfactual.  It is important to understand the 
full  implications  of  table  8 and the associated  regression  analysis  in 
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growth rate in an area's labor supply as the sum of the component  due 
to natives,  Anj(t,t'),  and the part due to immigrants,  Amj(t,t'),  for area 
j  between  years  t  and t'.  They  then  ask,  in equation  8,  whether  the 
change in the annual native contribution to the population growth rate 
in area j  between  the periods  1960-70  and 1970-90  is related to the 
change  in the immigrant contribution between  the same periods.  The 
regression  analysis  in table 9 confirms that there is a strong negative 
relation between  these two changes  in growth rates, which the authors 
interpret as implying  that declines  in native  population growth in the 
different  area markets exactly  off-set  the immigration  shock  in those 
markets. The offset  is relative to the preexisting  trend in native popu- 
lation growth in the market, rather than to a "no  growth"  counterfac- 
tual.  So,  this is their restatement of the critical natural experiment. 
What does  this  imply  for the  simple  natural experiment  involving 
the three regional groups (California,  other immigrant-receiving  states, 
and all others)? Based  on data in tables  1 and 8 and some population 
totals for the United States,  one can compute that the population of the 
state of California grew at a simple rate of 3.4  percent over the period 
1960-70  and at exactly  the same rate over  the period  1970-90.  The 
native contribution over the period  1960-70,  AncA(60,70),  is 2.9  per- 
cent,  and the immigrant contribution,  /mCA(60,70),  is 0.5  percent. The 
other immigrant-receiving  states grew  at a simple  rate of  1.7  percent 
over this period,  purely as a result of growth in the native-born popu- 
lation.  And  the  other  states  grew  at  1.5  percent  (1.6  percent  from 
natives and -0.1  percent from immigrants).  Over the period 1970-90, 
California continued  to grow at the simple  annual rate of 3.4  percent, 
now comprising  1.7 percent natives and 1.7 percent immigrants. Hence 
the difference  in the native contribution to the population growth rate, 
AnCA(70,90)  -  AnCA(60,70),  is  -1.2  percent,  and  the  associated 
difference  in  the  immigrant  contribution  shocks,  AmCA(70,90)  - 
AmCA(60,70), is  1.2 percent. For the other immigrant-receiving  states, 
the difference  in the native growth rate contribution is  -0.3  percent, 
and the difference  in the immigrant contribution is 0.5 percent. Finally, 
for  all  other  states,  the  difference  in  the  native  contribution  to  the 
growth rate is 0.0  percent and the difference  in the immigrant contri- 
bution is 0.2  percent. 
In  greatly  simplified  form,  this  illustrates  the  authors'  point:  the 
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there was no shock to the area labor markets. Rather, natives who would 
otherwise  have been in the immigrant-receiving  areas (especially  Cali- 
fornia) diffused  through the rest of the country.  The authors' method 
implies  that over the twenty-year  period from  1970 to  1990,  approxi- 
mately  3.4  million  native-born  Americans  stayed  where  they  were 
rather than migrate to California,  and an additional 2.0  million  native- 
born Americans stayed where they were rather than migrate to the other 
immigrant-receiving  states. I strongly suspect that the authors knew this 
before they conducted the rest of the analysis,  and it strongly motivated 
the functional  forms that are found in table 9. 
Having  estimated  the  effects  of  immigration,  the  authors turn to 
trade, continuing their earlier approach of trying to estimate the implicit 
increase  in domestic  labor supply from net trade flows.  The main iin- 
provements over their 1996 paper are the attempt to estimate the flows 
by source (LDCs versus developed  countries) and the use of microdata 
at the establishment  level  to distinguish  the production technologies  of 
plants  within  a given  industry.  These  improvements  permit them  to 
calculate the implicit labor supply of net imports. Their most interesting 
findings  are summarized  in table  17,  which  considers  the amount by 
which trade increases the (implicit) labor supply of different educational 
groups under three different  technology  assumptions.  The  "low"  as- 
sumption means that the goods  produced by LDCs use average current 
technology  factor  proportions.  The  "middle"  assumption  uses  tech- 
nologies  that are ten  to  fifteen  years  old  to  estimate  the  factor  pro- 
portions.  And the "high"  assumption assumes that the LDCs use tech- 
nology  from  the  1970s.  These  proportions  are  based  on  the  factor 
proportions in the relevant three-digit  standard industrial classification 
from the appropriate period. There is no attempt to assess Robert Feen- 
stra's  argument that within-industry  import-export  behavior  is  more 
important than between-industry  substitution in explaining  the success 
of LDC penetration of U.S.  product markets. If these estimates  are to 
address the criticisms  that have been leveled  at the method,  more data 
on LDC production processes  and attention to within-industry  import 
integration into the production process  need to be included. 
I think that the authors could  make more progress.  What is needed 
is  some  direct  information  on  the  age  of  the  technology  and on  the 
processes  used by the LDC producers. It is not clear that this evidence 
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Panel meeting,  if they had the technical  data on how goods  were made 
in LDCs,  the authors would  not necessarily  have concluded  that LDC 
producers were using  older technologies  that embodied  a lot of  lower 
skilled  labor in their goods. 
Let me finally  talk a little  bit about the authors' overall  estimates. 
Table  19 summarizes the factor proportional analysis.  It does so under 
the middle assumptions,  so that the importing industries are using tech- 
nologies  that are ten to fifteen years old and thus are embodying  rela- 
tively  more less  skilled  labor than do the best producers currently. As 
described  above,  according  to their analysis,  most of the effect  is fo- 
cused on the lowest  skilled group; that is,  there is a fall in the wage of 
high school dropouts relative to all others. The percentage contributions 
show  that post-1979  immigration is responsible  for a fairly large pro- 
portion of  this decline;  using  the middle elasticity  estimate,  about 40 
percent of the decline  in the real wage of high school  dropouts relative 
to all others. 
But regardless  of which  assumptions  are used,  the rest of the labor 
market is not very much affected.  What the authors ought to conclude 
is that, yet again, they have presented a substantial amount of evidence 
to indicate that it is a very specific  part of the domestic  labor market- 
the less skilled group-that  bears the brunt of the redistributional effect, 
both from immigration  and from trade. The authors have marshaled a 
lot more evidence  on the immigration  side than was available  before, 
but I do not think they have produced as much incremental evidence  on 
the trade side.  I would encourage them to obtain more direct evidence 
on the trade effects  and to use less  of the inferential evidence. 
General  discussion:  William  Branson described the paper as taking a 
closed  economy  view  of trade effects  because of its emphasis on quan- 
tities  rather than relative  prices.  A  model  better reflecting  the  "trade 
view"  would  start with other countries having different factor endow- 
ment ratios,  and so different factor price ratios, than the United States. 
As  barriers to  trade are lowered,  the  relative  factor  returns become 
more equal.  In the United States,  this results in a rise in the returns to 
skilled labor relative to unskilled labor. He noted that everything works 
off  these relative  price changes  in this model,  and quantities need not 
change much for trade to have these effects.  Katz replied that in general- 
equilibrium models such as Paul Krugman's,  the factor content of trade George  J.  Borjas,  Richard B. Freeman,  and Lawrence  F.  Katz  83 
gives  the same results as do the price changes.  Since it is easier to work 
with quantities than prices in such a framework, he regarded the meth- 
odology  in the paper as the right way to proceed. However,  he acknowl- 
edged  that the  model  could  miss  some  trade effects  operating  only 
through  prices,  such  as  cases  where  workers  receive  rents  that  are 
eroded just by the threat of trade, when trade barriers fall.  Robert Hall 
observed  that by focusing  on real GDP rather than consumption,  the 
paper does not adequately measure the benefits of trade. If the terms of 
trade shift in favor of a country, GDP may not rise,  although properly 
deflated real incomes  will. 
Branson also noted that Europe and the United States have had very 
different labor market outcomes  in terms of wages  and unemployment 
over the past decade,  which suggests  two different ways of reacting to 
the same  shock.  Katz saw  this as evidence  that institutions  matter in 
determining  wage  outcomes.  He also  noted that countries  with faster 
growth in the relative supply of educated workers had smaller increases 
in inequality,  which  conflicts  with the  "trade view"  that only  world 
factor proportions matter. He knew of no theoretical  model that could 
integrate globalization  and domestic  institutions.  Freeman pointed out 
another broad outcome not predicted by trade models: as the percentage 
of  goods  from  LDCs  increases,  predominantly  in  industries  such  as 
apparel that disproportionately employ women,  women's  wages should 
fall.  Yet they have risen in the United States and elsewhere,  indicating 
that other factors have dominated women's  relative wages. 
William Nordhaus questioned some of the paper' s other assumptions. 
He was curious about the evidence  underlying the assumption of com- 
plementarity between  skilled  workers and capital.  He had serious res- 
ervations  about the returns to scale  of the production function,  which 
effectively  assumes that immigrants can spread out without any conges- 
tion  effects.  Adding  land,  or  any  fixed  factor,  would  make  a large 
change to the calculated benefits of immigration.  For example,  putting 
land and other fixed factors  into a Cobb-Douglas  production function 
with a conservative  coefficient  of 0.05  and adding 5 percent to the labor 
force results in an $18 billion  penalty for the labor increase,  enough to 
reverse  the  sign  of  net benefits.  And  this  does  not even  account  for 
environmental effects,  such as fixed national quotas on greenhouse gas 
emissions  or sulfur dioxide,  or congestion  effects,  which are likely  to 
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gested parts of the country. He suggested  that a measure of sustainable 
consumption by natives would better capture these effects.  Robert Hall 
responded that there are positive  externalities  that could reverse these 
conclusions.  Their existence  is revealed  by immigrants'  own  choices 
of where to live: they choose  high-density  areas because  that is where 
the wages  are highest,  exactly  because of these externalities.  Even the 
notion  that the United  States  is being  overwhelmed  by congestion  is 
inaccurate,  since  studies  have  found,  for  example,  that commuting 
times  in  Los  Angeles  have  actually  declined  since  1950.  Nordhaus 
clarified that he was not addressing the level  of congestion  today,  but 
rather that the cost  of adding to it through immigration was not being 
measured. 
Several  panelists  discussed  the use of educational  attainment in the 
analysis  of relative  wages.  Jonathan Gruber questioned  whether years 
of  schooling  should have the same effect  if they were received  in the 
United  States or abroad. James Duesenberry remarked that comparing 
years of schooling  across time periods is hazardous, noting that in 1960, 
49.5  percent of workers were high school dropouts, while in 1995 only 
9 percent were. In addition, the personal characteristics of dropouts has 
changed dramatically over this period, as entirely different social forces 
have  influenced  whether  people  finished  high  school.  Robert Shiller 
suggested  that education is basically  signaling,  and the signal from any 
level  of educational  attainment changes  over time.  People  in the cate- 
gory  of  dropout have  changed  over  time; currently there are so  few, 
and they  tend  to  have  specific  ability  differences,  such  as executive 
dysfunctions  (where  they  are unreliable),  attention  deficit  disorders, 
reading disabilities,  or mental illnesses.  He suggested  using character- 
istics  such as these,  rather than educational  attainment. 
Katz noted that the paper is not assuming that high school  dropouts 
were  the  same  now  as  in  1960,  but rather that the gap  between  the 
people  in  adjoining  educational  attainment cells  is  comparable.  The 
evidence  from the distribution of income,  comparing the wages  of the 
top twentieth  percentile  with the bottom eightieth,  for example,  indi- 
cates that the gap has been relatively  steady. Regarding the type of data 
that Shiller  suggested,  Katz believed  that panels classifying  such dis- 
orders would  not indicate  whether the people  were immigrants and so 
are not  applicable  to the paper's  purpose.  Freeman added that while 
Shiller raised the possibility  that the rise in inequality reflected a drop George  J.  Borjas,  Richard B.  Freeman,  and Lawrence  F.  Katz  85 
in the abilities  of people  in the bottom groups,  results from following 
cohorts of the same people revealed  that wage trends are found within 
cohorts.  Looking  at high school  dropouts from twenty-five  years ago, 
wages  were  stable  at first but have  fallen  sharply in the  last  twenty 
years. 
Nordhaus suggested  giving  more attention to ethnicity,  in addition 
to skills and education.  According  to assimilationists,  immigrants face 
a wage  penalty,  but after a few  generations  their descendants  regress 
toward the  national  average.  Historically,  Mexican  immigrants  have 
been  the exception,  suffering  a wage  penalty  that has worsened  over 
generations.  Now  native-born  Hispanics  might  experience  a  similar 
effect  with recent immigration depressing  their earnings. 
Nordhaus  also  observed  that the  paper's  finding  that immigration 
rather than trade accounted for the relative wage declines  of the poorest 
workers is not reflected in the political  discussion,  which stresses trade 
protection over immigration reform. He recognized  that attacks on im- 
migration have always  sounded a little Philistine  and surely not politi- 
cally  correct.  Yet in light of the effects  of immigration on the bottom 
fifth of the income distribution, it was hard to avoid the conclusion  that 
present immigration policies  are badly flawed. 86  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1997 
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